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security Use laminated glass
Page 92
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by Inspector K. W. Norman,
Crime Prevention Section, New Scotland Yard.
• Lessons can be learned from the recer attack mounted on a van in the Hyde Par Corner underpass, when the vehicle wa halted through the thieves staging a series c contrived altercations between two driver culminating in a blockage of the underpass.
The choice of ambush site and the methcx by which the target vehicle was halte without a premature raising of the alarm wa very imaginative. This attack furthe underlines the need for firms to chang vehicles' routes and running times; t( appreciate and avoid likely afribush sites; and perhaps, what is of most importance, it point: to the need for drivers to be alert, realizin( that their movements may be known tt thieves.
If despite precautions, a violent attack mounted, it is of paramount importance tha the driver's cab is secure and can withstanc attack long enough for the driver to gair assistance by use of radio-telephone, vehicle alarm or manually sounding the horn o flashing the lights. This time can be bought, and "bought" is the operative word, by spending money to raise the cab's security standard. Doors should be fitted with the normal security hardware such as mortise deadlocks, mortise rack bolts and/or barre bolts. The removal of the exterior door handle on the n'earside cab door as a preventive measure is only suitable where a low security standard will suffice.
The windscreen should be of laminated glass and of course, a thicker windscreen giving better protection costs and weighs more. Although a bandit-resistant quality is desirable in high-risk situations, a standard laminated glass windscreen does make a tremendous contribution to security.
Door windows should be similarly considered for 'replacement by laminated glass, but in some cases it may be sufficient to install a metal grille inside the normal window. Ventilation can be a problem and consequently suitable arrangements are essential if security safeguards are not to be undermined.
An immediate display of force on the part of thieves, commits them to the necessity of completing the attack as quickly as possible. In addition, their actions focus attention and produce quick reactions from witnesses. Furthermore, damage inflicted on the vehicle will draw attention to it when it is subsequently in the hands of the thieves. Many tricks have been pulled in the past in order to induce drivers to alight. Bogus police officers, fictitious requests for assistance and signs to indicate something amiss with the target vehicle are all ruses which have been adopted.
High-risk vehicles should be fitted with a concealed but boldly printed notice along these lines: "This is a security vehicle—I will follow you to the nearest police station should you require me to open the cab or to alight." This notice should be displayed to anyone attempting to converse with or to persuade the driver to alight.