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CHUNNEL PROBE

7th July 1967, Page 80
7th July 1967
Page 80
Page 80, 7th July 1967 — CHUNNEL PROBE
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Which of the following most accurately describes the problem?

EXQUISITE or malicious according to one's viewpoint—but more probably accidental—was the timing of the publication by the British Road Federation of a memorandum to the Ministry of Transport setting out the safeguards required by road users if railway vehicles only are to be allowed to run through the

Channel tunnel.

The dispute over the Stratford terminal, with threats of a general rail strike, made topical, for example, the suggestion that the shuttle service through the tunnel should be "fully insulated" against strikes or lockouts affecting the domestic operation of British Rail or the SNCF. There could not fail also to be echoes in the mind of reported discussions between Mr. Harold Wilson and General de Gaulle on the prospects of Britain being allowed to enter the Common Market.

No specific obstacle

The decision by the Government to proceed with the necessary preliminary planning for the tunnel means that there is no specific obstacle visible which can prevent it from coming into service some time in the mid-1970s. No gathering of hostile interests is likely to besiege the House of Commons and demand a Royal Commission as has happened with the dispute over Stansted airport. There is no nucleus of people that the tunnel would affect adversely to such an extent as to give them the right of appeal.

In these circumstances the Federation has gone about as far as it can. The memorandum points out that the two bodies representing road users on both sides of the Channel would have preferred a "road/rail facility"—Channel link jargon for a bridge. At the moment they can see no prospect of this hope being fulfilled. They hold back from making a general assault on the tunnel idea but the lines that such an attack would take are clear in the tone and context of the memorandum.

After all, the safeguards that the Federation seeks would be difficult if not impossible to obtain in full. The memorandum acknowledges that it is only the strike without notice which can be outlwed, as at present in the gas, electricity and watersupply industries. The fact that a strike will have to be official may be of little comfort if, as the memorandum points out, the availability of other cross-Channel services is considerably reduced, thus making "the users of the tunnel facility extremely vulnerable to industrial disputes by the staff and workpeople of the operational company".

In the context of recent events this statement is not likely to strengthen the enthusiasm of trade and industry for the tunnel. The possibility of switching to road transport should there be a rail strike has been reassuring. It is not a foregone conclusion, of course, that the reduction in cross-Channel facilities which the Federation fears will take place. Ferry and container services are growing as well as the more conventional methods of shipping goods. There will be plenty of time for other new developments before the tunnel is built.

Far from destroying the Federation's argument this seems to add force to the case for second thoughts even at the present stage. Many of the Federation's other proposals lead in the same direction. Particular stress is laid on the drawbacks of railway domination. Charges could be fixed so as to favour long-distance traffic going all the way by rail. The timetables could be drawn up in a form that would be against the interests of road transport and of private motorists.

One suggestion

Exactly how such dangers can be overcome is not clear. In each case the Federation uses almost exactly the same wording and asks for adequate arrangements "to protect the interests of all users on a nondiscriminatory basis". The one suggestion to this end is that the operating company should not be predominantly a railway concern. In particular the dual role of the British and French railways should not be allowed to prejudice the interests of users.

The railways should be no more than subcontractors to the operating company, says the Federation. This role should be kept "separate and distinct from that in which they become users of the tunnel for the conveyance of their own traffic". There must be safeguards to ensure that in that capacity "they do not enjoy preferential treatment to the detriment of other users".

The difficulty of enforcing this kind of requirement is easy to see. The railways are bound to run the trains to suit their own requirements and will have cogent reasons for not doing otherwise. Gross inequities can usually be frustrated by regulation but in general road operators will have to fit their arrangements into the services which the railways will offer.

One test of the effect of the Federation's arguments may soon be possible. It is pointed out that companies which might be interested in building the tunnel have apparently been given no clear guide on the maximum dimensions and weights of the road vehicles to be ferried through by the railways. The tunnel might with advantage be slightly larger than is at present envisaged. Agreement should be sought between all the interests concerned on "the optimum size of the tunnel and on the loadings that it could be called upon to bear".

A brief comment

Many of the other possibly harmful effects will not become apparent until it is too late. In a brief and tactfully worded comment the Federation gives a hint of possible "discriminatory restrictions being imposed by the terminal countries on onward traffic to other countries". Of the two "terminal countries" involved, of course, only one is likely to be concerned with onward traffic and it has none too good a record for its negotiations with British hauliers carrying that traffic. Perhaps more success may be found with the safeguards which the Federation desires but does not specify.

On the subject of access roads the Federation comes into its own. The minimum requirements are said to include a motorway from the tunnel terminal to the eastern end of the present Maidstone motorway by-pass, A20(M). Estimates are not given of the cost of this road and others but it must be considerable. The tunnel itself is expected at the most recent estimate to cost something "of the order of LI55-170m. at 1966 prices" according to the Ministry of Transport.

The Ministry and the Federation are best qualified to balance this substantial expenditure against the communications needs of the rest of the country. Similar considerations arise from the accentuated—and in other contexts undesirable—drift to the South of England if the high hopes entertained for the tunnel are realized.


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