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Everything must go...

6th October 2005, Page 36
6th October 2005
Page 36
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Which of the following most accurately describes the problem?

When the Tories tried to sell the haulage industry back to hauliers no one was trampled in the rush. Patric Cunnane reports.

When the Conservatives returned to power in 1951 they promised to denationalise the road transport industry, which had been taken into public ownership by Clement A tlee in 1947.

The Tories honoured this pledge within two years by introducing the Transport Act (1953). When it became law CM published an 11,000word guide in its edition of 15 May 1953 and readers could buy extra copies for Is 6c1 (7..5p).

The tumultuous battle fought in Parliament and elsewhere, which preceded the act's passing was reported by CM in the language of the class war. "Socialists Put Up Last-minute Stand" was one headline from 24 April 1953, over a report on the 68 amendments tabled by the opposition to add to the 70 already tabled by the Lords, Fiery future PM Jim Callaghan led Labour's onslaught on the bill against 78-year-old Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

At this point the battle had been raging for a year. Opposition to the bill coalesced at a demonstration in Margate on 31 August 1952, timed to coincide with the TUC Congress.

Several unions condemned the bill. "The National Union of Vehicle Builders' motion says that any claim for compensation upon renationalisation should be fully resisted," (CM 1 August 1952).

Nationwide petition

The railwaymen and miners also waded in. At a Transport Se General Workers Union meeting in Newcastle "Mr A Robens, formerly Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport, announced that a nationwide petition would be drawn up. He said that he did not think denationalisation would ever be carried out," (CM 1 August 1952).

Churchill stoutly defended the bill in Parliament."Although only V2qh of the total number of commercial vehicles on the road had been taken over by the State," he said, an enormous centralised overhead organisa lion has been set up at very heavy cost and with far-reaching powers.

"I have no doubt that all the 12,000 officials, apart altogether from the ordinary management, did their best to manage the 41.000 vehicles," he said.

"It is our belief that a vehicle in the hands of a private haulier, able to carry anyone's goods and allowed to cater in free competition for the public need, is a more flexible and efficient instrument than it can be in the hands of a vast, unwieldy, centralised public corporation for whose sake other hauliers must be hampered and restricted." (CM 12 September 1952).

Callaghan managed to simultaneously threaten collaborators and imply that they were unpatriotic.

CM reported that he said:"The government's trouble with denationalisation would really begin when it tried to sell the vehicles back to free hauliers" He added that "in the view of the Labour Party, anyone who bought vehicles from the Road Haulage Executive would be acting against the national interests and need not be surprised if his fingers were burnt when the Conservatives were next defeated."

Meanwhile, on the wilder shores of opposition, the Liberal Party had denounced the bill for not going far enough. It called for all licensing control of road transport to be abandoned. CM described this suggestion as "impractical" and "asking too much" (CM 15 August 1952).

The bill duly became law, and under the headline "Freedom For Transport —The New Act Explained" CM's TG Field-Fisher set out its terms (CM 15 May 1953). The act required the British Transport Commission—the body set up in 1947 to oversee transport nationalisation—to dispose of most of the 41,000 vehicles supervised by the Road Haulage Executive. It was allowed to retain British Road Services, which included a general haulage fleet, and the Pickfords heavy haulage. tankers and furniture removal fleet.

The six-member Road Haulage Disposal Board was created; it was briefed to report back to the minister twice a year.

The haulage undertakings were put out to tender by the BTC. Sales included sites and vehicles but, unless approved by the minister, no buyer could buy more than 50 vehicles with "an aggregate maximum unladen weight of 200 tons".

Embarrassing failure A clause limiting most operators to a 25-mile radius of base was abolished.

However, following the transport industry's dogged opposition to nationalisation in the 1940s, the widespread reluctance to re-enter the industry as private businesses proved to be an embarrassing failure for the government. "There was strong demand for the vehicle-only units. but the level of interest in the larger transport units and the companies was disappointing," says the Companion to British Road Haulage History.

"Many prenationalisation operators were able to buy back their businesses for less than the compensation they had received, but even this was not tempting enough for many. By mid-1955 some of the vehicles were being put up for sale for the third time and it was apparent that many, particularly the large trunking vehicles, were going to remain unsold."

As a result BRS was allowed to retain not only general haulage and Pickfords, but its parcels operation and its meat division, which had been offered for sale as single units,but had attracted no bidders.

The embarrassing denationalisation process came to a halt in August 1956 when the Transport (Disposal of Road Haulage Property) Act 1956 allowed BRS to retain its contract-hire vehicles as long as the contracts continued. BRS had five giant divisions: BRS (Parcels); British Road Services (for general haulage); BRS (Contracts); BRS (Pickfords) and BRS (Meat Haulage).

Out of 35,018 vehicles put up for sale BRS retained 14,378, or 41% of the fleet. Although the vehicle tally changed over the years the situation remained much the same until Margaret Thatcher privatised the then National Freight Corporation in the 1980s.

The sale of 20,640 vehicles had resulted in what was at the time a huge loss to the exchequer. It realised £26.2m, "i7.8m less than the associated 'goodwill' that had been the book value of the disposed assets (including the associated 'goodwill' that had been paid by the BTC at nationalisation). When the expenses of acquisition and disposal were added, the overall loss was calculated at £12.4m", according to the CBRHH.

However, the government had a cunning — and unpopular— plan to recoup any losses.The 1953 act had introduced a temporary transport levy payable on all vehicles over 1.5 tonnes to meet the losses it envisaged.The payment covered a three-year period and was applied to both tractor units and trailers. It ranged from £2 14s for a 1.5-tonne trailer and .£4 I s for a two-tonne tractor unit to £5 8s for a trailer over four tonnes and £16 4s for a tractor unit over eight tonnes.

Burden of proof There were changes to licensing regulations too. In future Traffic Commissioners deciding on applications would he required to put the public interest before that of the operator.

However, when it came to objections the burden of proof was reversed. From now on the objector had to prove the grounds on which his objection was based.

CM thought this would increase applications and, therefore, competition and would not be welcomed by hauliers (CM 15 May 1953).

There was no change to the requirement for the TC to take into account whether a new service was needed except that he would have to base his comparisons on services existing at the time of the application. II • NEXT MONTH: Barbara Castle and the 1960s SOURCES:

Companion to British Road Haulage History, editors various; published by the Science Museum. www.nmsi.ac.uk Commercial Motor

1952-53