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Voting and vetoing

4th June 1983, Page 42
4th June 1983
Page 42
Page 42, 4th June 1983 — Voting and vetoing
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Which of the following most accurately describes the problem?

EVEN IF Britain were not on the eve of a General Election, next Tuesday's gathering of EEC Council of Transport Ministers in Luxembourg would be unlikely to achieve very much. Of all the policy areas dealt with in the Rome Treaty, transport has made least progress. By now expectations are so low that the meetings are almost a nonevent. The only interest stems from the possibility of a major row, and even that is rare.

There are indeed fundamental disagreements between Transport Ministers on policy items. But policy differences do not prevent national legislatures from acting. They resolve differences by voting. The EEC Council of Ministers is the EEC's legislative body: why can it not resolve its differences in the same democratic way?

The Treaty of Rome is in no doubt that this is how it should be done. But a simple majority would not meet the needs of the situation. Of the original six countries which signed the Treaty in 1975, France, West Germany and Italy provided most of the money. Even in those idealistic early days they were not prepared to give the three small members — Belgium, the

Netherlands and Luxembourg — the power to block progress. Equally, the small members were not prepared to allow the three large countries a free hand.

The Treaty therefore laid down a complicated system known as qualified majority voting, in a process sometimes irreverently (and inaccurately) compared with the Eurovision Song Contest. The two enlargements of the EEC have required alterations to the details, but have left unchanged the principle of a balance between the rights of large and small countries.

Today each country has a number of votes, roughly according to its size, as follows: United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy 10 votes each Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands 5 votes each Denmark and Ireland 3 votes each Luxembourg 2 votes If asimple majority of this total of 63 votes was all that was required to win a vote, the four big countries would easily be able to outvote the six smaller members. So a minimum of 45 votes is normally required. Thus, even if all four large countries are in agreement — a rare event in the transport field — at least one small country must also support them if the necessary minimum is to be reached.

But there is also a further safeguard for the interests of the smaller states. In most cases, in addition to the minimum of 45 votes, at least six countries must support a proposal. This means that, even if unanimous, the large countries must attract the support of at least two smaller countries.

From the point of view of the smaller countries, even if all six agree they must also win over three major members to achieve the necessary 45 votes.

Since so many people tend to imagine that the Commission has almost dictatorial powers it is perhaps worth pointing out that they have no votes at all.

In practice of course, the ten members do not normally divide according to size. On transport matters, although the six small countries normally take a liberal line, there is a deep divide among the others. Britain on the one hand takes a liberal line, while Germany and Italy are more restrictive, with France also tending to the restrictive side.

In practice all this is irrelevant. The voting procedure is not used. If one member country — even tiny Luxembourg — does not agree, the proposal fails.

The reason for this dates back to 1966, when the so-called "Luxembourg compromise" was reached. In mid-1965 France (where de Gaulle was still in power) had walked out — and stayed out — of all EEC institutions after a row about money which turned on whether a country could be outvoted in the Council on a matter which it considered vital to its national interests. Six months later, after intense pressure from the other • five countries, an agreement was drawn up which, in effect, gives individual countries a power of veto in matters which they consider very important.

This compromise has governed meetings of the Council of Ministers ever since. The provisions of the Treaty of Rome are ignored — remarkable in such a legalistic organisation.

Attempts have been made to explain away this gap between law and reality by references to the veto as a "Community practice". It is true that the letter of the law is invoked on very rare occasions, and a vote is taken. This happened most recently in May last year when an isolated Peter Walker was outvoted over the farm price review.

In the transport field it is clear that the veto has not been confined to vital national interests. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine anything like a majority for any transport legislation which could merit such a description. On the contrary, the veto has been used in cases involving what are, by any standards, trivia. A five per cent

increase in the number of EEC permits, or minor additions to the list of categories exempted from the drivers' hours legislation, are not going to cause currencies to collapse or bring rioters out on to the streets. The veto has simply become a bad habit.

It is tempting to believe that, if the Luxembourg compromise were confined to genuinely vital matters, the adoption of qualified majority voting would speed up progress towards the Common Transport Policy. Certainly the European Court of Justice, which is currently considering the European Parliament's complaint about the Council's slow progress, may have something to say on this.

But a closer examination must raise doubts. Germany and Icaly have enough votes between them to block any liberalisation proposals, however minor, even if France did not side with them. And on weights and dimensions Britain and Ireland have enough to prevent adoption of the Commission's latest ideas involving 40 tonnes maximum gross weight.

There are also possibilities for the sort of procedural squabbles so beloved in Brussels. Ministers do not have to vote one way or the other; they can also abstain. Many would be tempted to do so in order to avoid upsetting either vested interests at home, or another country whose support they want on another matter. The magic 45 votes from six countries would probably be as rare as unanimity is today.

It is difficult to see how a continuation of the stalemate can be avoided, whatever ruling emerges from the court on the Parliament's complaint. If so, the six-monthly meeting of Transport Ministers will continue to be non-events.