1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156 
It's all a matter of economics
Page 73
If you've noticed an error in this article please click here to report it so we can fix it.
IN THEORY containerization should favour rail, since a train load of containers, drawn by a single locomotive with a two-man crew, must surely be more economical than the equivalent number of containers being hauled, long-distance by, say, 40 or 60 road vehicles.
Perhaps the key to this reasoning lies in the words "long distance". Between Chicago and New Jersey, USA; between Bremerhaven and Milan on the Continent where distances in excess of 1,000 miles or so are involved, rail definitely has the advantage. But between Ancoates and Croydon, here in the UK, the theory wears a little thin, especially when one reads in Commercial Motor (May 231 that the National Freight Corporation has taken over from British Railways a Freightliner system which is reported to be losing £250,000 a month, making an annual loss of between £3m and £4m.
One wonders whether this is the full story of losses, since the evidence leads uncomfortably to the conclusion that more is being lost—traffic which, was originally taken from hauliers through rate cutting.
Compare BR's figures for last year, 1968, against the previous year. According to the annual report, 300,000 containers were carried in 1968—the last year BR operated the system. This was three times the number of units in 1967, only a year previously. Gross receipts for 1968 amounted to £6.4 million against £3.9m in 1967. Out of this, total traffic given to rail by road hauliers amounted to 25 per cent of the whole, while traffic carried for National Carriers Ltd. (which was still part of BR at the beginning of the year) was 15 per cent. By the end of the year, the weekly average number of containers being used was 7,000.
Freightliners Ltd„ while not denying that there is a deficit, stresses that this situation is only temporary and the service will balance its accounts when it reaches full development. But as a bewildered bystander (and taxpayer) I cannot help wondering whether this is being somewhat optimistic, bearing in mind that while traffic increased by 300 per cent last year, as mentioned earlier, receipts increased by only 65 per cent. In other words, the financial return per unit carried has dropped drastically.
Where, one may quite legitimately ask, has the money gone? A reliable source feels that some of it—quite a large proportion—has been lost in terminal operations. Bear in mind the fact that a tractive unit, plus trailer and driver, costs between £25 to £30 a day to operate and maintain. On the minimum rate applied for terminal haulage by Freightliners Ltd., each tractor requires to make 21 journeys per working day. Using the Stratford Freightliner terminal as a yardstick, since it is one of the busiest in the country, the number of journeys undertaken by terminal tractors is 1.7 journeys per vehicle day.
The losses on terminals can be estimated when one knows that the average terminal run is 7 to 8 miles, for which the company charges £12 for a 20ft unit up to 16 tons weight, and £14 over 16 tons and for 30ft containers. Taking into account other intelligence available, the average loading in a Freightliner container is said to be about 10 tons, while the number of containers used in each size is said to be about 50 per cent (for a 30ft) 40 per cent (2Oft) and 10 per cent (1Gft).
Assuming that the average daily return per tractor (£13 1.7) is £22 while the cost of running a tractor is, say £27 10s, this represents a loss of £5 10s a day on each tractor; and assuming that Freightliners have 1,500 tractive units in operation, this totals Out at about £8,000 loss per day, or £176,000 per month of 22 working days. Add this sum to the unavoidable losses incurred through empty container running and under-utilized blocktrains and one begins to see the difficulties that the NFC has inherited. True, as traffic builds up and more containers are used, the trains will become more profitable. But the terminal loss is serious and appears to have no immediate solution other than a higher output per tractive unit and driver.
Again, one comes back to the initial theory and the words "long distance". Is LondonGlasgow "long distance" in terms of the container; indeed, are there any long-distance domestic routes within the United Kingdom and should not all containers here be road hauled ?