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Surprising letters in H ixon inquiry
Page 60
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• As stated on page 55. some surprise was caused at the opening of the Hixon level crossing inquiry by the revelation of four letters between Robert Wynn and British Railways. Extracts • from these letters, with much other material omitted, are as follows:—
From Robert Wynn and Sons Ltd. to the chief 'civil engineer, British Railways, Western Region. Paddington.
November 19, 1966 Dear Sir, We are concerned with a report Which we have received from the driver of one of our Scammell 25-ton low-loaders relating to an incident which occurred at Leominster level crossing at approximately 5.30 p.m. on November 8 last. Our driver • reports that when he approached the crossing from the direction of Ludlow, the barriers were in the raised position and there was no indication of a train approaching. He proceeded to pass over the crossing but, for some mason of which we are not aware, his vehicle grounded, and the vehicle, which was carrying a heavy crane, became immobilized across your permanent way.
Our driver alighted to ascertain the cause and to see what could be done to remove the vehicle from the crossing. He was then informed by some workmen nearby that an express train was due shortly. Almost immediately the warning lights started to flash, your workmen cleared away from the crossing, and your signalman said that he could not stop the express.
With considerable presence of mind. our driver got back into the cab of his vehicle and by excessive revving of the engine and use of the clutch. he succeeded in removing from the crossing just as an express train passed across.
We believed that the express stopped but some half El Mile beyond the crossing.
Our driver reported the incident to railway officials at Leominster, also to the civil police. If our information is correct— and it is this that causes us concern— the trains themselves actuate the warning lights and barriers, and, with regard to express trains, it is only a merrier of seven to 10 seconds before they are on the crossing. In addition, therein no means of warning the train driver or of stopping the train.
There is no need for us to enlarge on the disaster which could have occurred at Leominster on November 8 had not our driver, with what we consider considerable bravery, succeeded in removing his vehicle.
We shall be glad to haveyourcomments in due course.
From British Railways Regional Headquarters, Paddington station, to Robert Wynn and Sons Ltd, November 29, 1966 Dear Sir, Mr. Barnwell has passed forward your letter of November 19 for my attention. I am naturally as much concerned as you are about this incident, which might have had much more serious consequences.
Automatic level-crossing barriers have been installed at a number of points on British Railways and are, of course, widespread in other countries. There is no difference in the circumstances at Leominster from any other barrier crossing. The design is approved by the Ministry. of Transport both on the railway and on the road side, and the contingency of a road
vehicle stalling on the level-crossing and becoming immovable was one that wan considered and found too remote to be taken as of serious consequence.
In brief, road vehicles must not become immobile on these crossings. If they do. they not only become a hazard to themselves, but they become a hazard to trains and to whoever are travelling in them.
I think I am quoting correctly what would be the view of the Ministry inspecting officer of railways. Had there been a serious . accident, it would have been subject to Ei Ministry inquiry and the principal point of inquiry would not have been the safety of the crossing, which is an approved one. but why the vehicle was on the line when the train approached and The barriers were about to close to road traffic.
The time interval between the warning rights and the closing of the barriers has been especially laid down by the Minister and, once again, there is no difference at Leominster than at other crossings. If the warning is too long, the public become accustomed to the length of time and start taking unjustifiable risks "to beat the lights".
A train travelling at high speed with no warning of anything amiss ahead takes something like three-quarters of a mile to stop, and this would explain why there was no means of stopping the express in question before it reached the crossing. It had evidently already passed any warning signal that could be given to it.
Nothing which has been said above in any way detracts from the action of your driver, which appears to have been in every way commendable. We are obviously grateful that he removed the hazard to safety at a risk to himself. I must emphasize, however, that the hazard was of your firm's making and ills fortunate that it was not more than a hazard.
Once the flashing lights start, then road vehicles are in a position of having to stop because of "major road ahead".
However, I am passing on this correspondence to the local divisional manager so that he can satisfy himself that there was no fault on the railway side that in any way contributed to the incident, and that our staff did all that could be expected of them in the circumstances.
ISignature illegible on copy). Extracts from letter dated January 11, 1986, from Robert Wynn and Sons Ltd. to the Chairman and General Manager, London Midland Region, British Railways, Euston House.
To assist us in determining routes and, where appropriate, giving warning to the police and others concerned, will you please let us have a map showing the location of the automatic crossings in your region and give us specific indication of any special hazards, such as height of wires and cables. If the production of such a reap will take some time, in the meanwhile will you please let us have sufficient details (e.g. Ordnance Survey referencesl to enable us to locate the crossings. Other letters to thatrmen and general managers of Eastern, Scottish, Southern and Western Regions.
From British Railways Board, London. N.W.1, to Robert Wynn and Sons Ltd. January 15, 1968 Dear Sir, Automatic Level Crossings I have been asked by the chairman of the British Railways Board to reply to your letter of January 11, together with its enclosures, and to reply also to the letters addressed to the chairmen and general managers of the five railway regions.
The duty of taking proper precautions at these level-crossings rests upon the usen who may pay full regard to the clearwarning notices and other safety precautione which are provided at all such crossings. If these am disregarded by users, then nc blame cah attach to the board for any resulting accident.
The board, therefore, are not preparec to comply with your request, nor to accepi the burden of providing hauliers with up. to-date information of what occurs al many places throughout the whole of the board's railways system.