"CUCKOO"
Page 65
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LAST week I traced the mental processes of longdistance hauliers full circle from disappointment that denationalization of British Road Services stopped at the half-way mark, through a period of indifference for which their preoccupation with their own affairs was partly responsible, back to their first opinion that B.R.S. ought to be broken up and sold as originally proposed in the Transport Act, 1953. What the hauliers are now thinking has its place in a wider setting.
Inevitably there is a strong political flavour. After some hesitation, a section of the Conservative party have made up their minds to advocate that the British Transport Commission should divest themselves of all activities except the railways. It is not easy to see the basic connection between all the items in the mixed bag of assets and liabilities making up the Commission. It includes undertakings, such as the passenger transport companies, the hotels and Thomas Cook and Son, Ltd., that are almost completely autonomous. B.R.S. might well be numbered among them. The argument runs that the Commission are in any case much too large to be operated successfully as a single entity, that they find their diversity of interests an embarrassment rather than otherwise, and that the obvious first step would be to cut adrift the oddments.
The position of B.R.S. is considered anomalous while they remain part of a much larger organization making enormous annual losses. They have been able themselves to show a reasonable profit in recent years, but one cannot be certain to what extent this may be regarded as a genuine profit while so many items of the Commission's costs, lumped together as central charges, are confounded in a common account. The shadow of the Commission's losses must fall to some extent on all the component parts, and to a considerable extent on the parts actually engaged in transport. It is reasonable, therefore, to ask how one part of a virtually, bankrupt undertaking can be permitted to acquire new assets, as B.R.S. have done. The question would not arise if B.R.S. were independent.
When the Time is Ripe ...
There is no guarantee that, if the Conservatives do nothing, the Socialists will follow their example. The next election may not take place until 1963, and the Socialists may lose again, but it is prudent to suppose that they will ultimately be returned to power. In spite of reverses they have so far shown themselves unrepentant. When the time is ripe, they may resume their policy of nationalization, and they will be bound to begin with transport, or possibly iron and steel. They will find it' helpful to have a road transport nucleus available. The task of taking over what is required of the rest of the industry will be easy. There would be many more difficulties if all traces of B.R.S. were obliterated.
-The attachment that hauliers have for free enterprise is genuine and not cynical. They think they can do a better job than nationalized transport and they would like to be given the opportunity. Many of them were disappointed and felt let down by the decision in 1956 to leave MRS. with the assets that remained unsold at that time. The way in which transport units and special-A licences subsequently changed hands, presumably at higher and higher prices, showed how great was the demand. There is little doubt that if the unsold items were offered again in suitable form the money could be found even among established operators without having to seek purchasers from outside the industry. Pressure from trade and industry was responsible for the political decision in 1956.. The fear was that, because of the preponderance of small purchasers, the continued disposal of the assets of B.R.S. would mean complete frag-mentation. There would be abundant competition and liveliness among hauliers, but no network of reliable services.
Many traders now think that the fear was exaggerated. They will never again become as indignant with nationalized transport as they were ten years ago when they first felt the impact. On the other hand, it is very rarely that they declare themselves satisfied with B.R.S. and they are frequently critical. This leads to a situation that the haulier finds annoying and that he believes justifies his renewed agitation for the Conservatives to finish the task they began in 1953. Traders who are at best lukewarm towards B.R.S. still find, because of licensing difficulties, that there is 'no haulier available for the carriage of their goods. They are therefore reacting in the usual way by putting their own vehicles on the road. So at least the haulier alleges, and finds some proof in thb latest statistics that show a quickening in the rate of increase among C-licensed vehicles.
Expel the Stranger Occasionally there is a hint that even the railways would do better under new and independent ownership. It remains no more than a hint, whereas the proposal for B.R.S. is made much more decidedly. The railways are seen to be a special case. They can remain nationalized while hauliers are free, and to few people does this seem an odd arrangement. The position is different when there is a fundamental cleavage of ownership within the same•form of transport. Hauliers are not alone in thinking of B.R.S. as an anomaly, a cuckoo in the nest. The instinct is to expel the stranger from the community.
The purchase of haulage businesses by B.R.S. brings to the surface the feeling—which again is not peculiar to hauliers—that there is something wrong. The operators who sell are entitled to find the highest bidder and tempting offers may be made to men who have decided that it is time to retire. Whether or not they are serving the cause of free enterprise can hardly come into the calculation. Possibly B.R.S. would often be in a position to make the best offer. They have the largest resources of any single operator. They .are not required to satisfy inquisitive and troublesome shareholders that a good financial return can be made on the investment. They have no absolute need to make a profit and no burning need to make more than a small profit.
The consequences raise questions that have not previously arisen and could hardly arise with any other nationalized undertaking. If the process is repeated sufficiently often, the issue may have to be thrashed out in Parliament. As a commercial enterprise, one might think B.R.S. ought to have the right of other commercial enterprises to trade freely and to expand, by purchase if appropriate. In that case they should also be allowed to contract, possibly by sale. This would, it might be argued, frustrate the intention of Parliament as expressed in the Act of 1956, which clearly laid down what the size of B.R.S. ought to be. The same argument might be used against the undue expansion of B.R.S. There would not be the same problem if they were restored to private ownership.
• [The views expressed by Janus are his own and do not reflect the editorial policy of The Commercial Motor. —En.]