PETROL-RATIONING CHAOS
Page 32
Page 33
If you've noticed an error in this article please click here to report it so we can fix it.
Present Scheme, if Maintained, Must Involve Disruption of the Haulage Industry and Immediate Ruin of go per • By cent. of Individual Hauliers. it is Unnecessary and the S.T.R. Product of an Obviously Rail-minded Government UTTER ruin faces 90 per cent of hauliers if the petrol-rationing scheme, as at present devised, is continued. If it were possible, the road-haulage
industry would 'be permanently destroyed by it. It will inevitably be disrupted for the period of the war, and only the fact that it is indestructible ensures its ultimate restoration. And we claim that, in the main, the restrictions on the use of fuel for legitimate road operations are quite unnecessary. It appears to be devised to direct all but purely local traffic to the railways and entirely ignores the fact that the railways, as at present constituted, are not merely inadequate to handle the traffic, but cannot deal with that proportion of it which, under present conditions, they are expected to handle.
The initial and all-important step, the rationing of the fuel is, in its conception and realization, a monument of ineptitude. The underlying principle appears to be this: that if the consumption be 1,500,000,000 gallons per annum, then some agreed proportion of that total, say, one-tenth, is all that can now be allocated for civilian use. The quantity thus available is apparently to be allocated, vehicle by vehicle, in proportion to its unladen weight, without consideration either for its proportionate consumption per mile or for the selective importance of the work upon which it is engaged. Above all, the fact that the professional haulier, with his organization for making the most of his mileage, can make one gallon of petrol do. as much as three in the tank of a vehicle belonging to an ancillary user, who has no such organization, appears' to be completely ignored.
• Loss of Fuel Means Loss of Livelihood • There is justification for making that consideration a primary one in the distribution of petrol, quite apart from the fact that to deprive a haulier of his fuel is to deprive him of his livelihood, whereas the ancillary user is not directly dependent on the profitable use of his vehicles, but may quite conveniently rely on hauliers' services to do the work for which, in normal times, he purchases these vehicles.
Some appreciation of the extent to which hauliers' operations are curtailed and their businesses affected may be appreciated by reference to figures. The petrol allowance for the average haulier will barely suffice to allow him to run it 20 miles per day. It is well known that it is inevitable, in the vast majority of cases, that that mileage is normally covered daily in travelling, in the morning, from the garage to the source of employment and in returning to the garage at night. The effective daily mileage in such cases is thus seen to be reduced to vanishing point.
Compare the foregoing with the experience of many hundreds of bakers, butchers and kindred tradesmen, A30 who find themselves allotted more petrol for the use of their delivery vans than they know how to consume.
It is just and necessary that, before I proceed to deal in detail with some of, the consequences of this illconceived restriction in road transport, I should indicate the direction in which should point the finger of scorn, not with any idea of emphasizing facts which, presumably, are widely known, but to ensure that the blame is not thrust upon shoulders upon which it should not rest. Such indication is necessary because already there are signs that some efforts thus unfairly to shift the blame are likely to be made.
It is common knowledge that, for a period of some 18 months or more, the leading road-transport organizations have been engaged in the patriotic and difficult task of implementing what has been called the "grouping scheme." The work has been done at the instigation of the Government, with a view to providing for the most efficient use of all forms of road transport in the event of war. An enormous amount of time, money, labour and materials has been expended on this task for no reward or remuneration of any kind. Both the principal associations are, in fact, very considerably out of pocket as the result of their efforts in this cause.
• A Bait for Dilatory Hauliers fr One of the arguments most truly used to persuade dilatory hauliers to join an appropriate group—it was, perhaps, more in the nature of an inducement than an argument—was that petrol would not be supplied during a state of emergency to those outside the groups. It was, quite reasonably, I think, assumed that those who did join a group would be allotted petrol in quantity which, whilst it might conceivably fall short of 'that normally consumed, would at least be enough to enable them to carry on a reasonable proportion of their business activities; enough, at least, to keep those businesses intact.
Now that it is being made clear that there is no such intention in the minds of those responsible for the workings of the Ministry of Transport, on whom already, has fallen the mantle and title of Ministry of Circumlocution —made so familiar during the last war—the associations will most assuredly be told, in the inevitable event of an outcry, that "They did it themselves." That is something which needs contradiction now, before it has time to he put forward in such form as might, but for This plain statement of the facts, gain credence.
Undoubtedly, however, the biggest blunder, to date, of the Ministry is the decision—futile as inept, as I shall show—to ban trunk services by road. It is expressed in the dictum that "petrol will only be available in quantities sufficient to facilitate distribution by road over a limited radius."
It can be shown that this procedure is impracticable and, at the same time, unnecessary; more, that if insisted upon, and I venture to predict that it will not, it would very seriously interfere with the distribution of foodstuffs ,and other essential commodities to an extent which would bring about a shortage in some parts of the country.
That the scheme is impracticable may best be shown by a brief description and criticism of the alternative, a co-ordination of road and rail services, as devised by the Road-Rail Conference. In passing, it is fair to point out that this scheme was agreed to by the Road members of the Conference under what may almost be described as duress. It represents the best that can be done to conserve and maintain the interests and custom of long-distance hauliers, in the belief that the Government seriously intends to eliminate, for the period of the war, that branch Of road transport. Viewed in that light, it is a commendable and meritorious service.
• Trunk Services Must be Maintained e
In considering and criticizing the plan, it is most important to bear in mind that it is the best that the efforts of the intelligentsia of road and rail transport executives can devise. Since it is impracticable, it follows that trunk services must be maintained.
It provides that the haulier shall collect his traffic, convey to nearest rail-head, where he is to sort it, and provide the labour for loading into the truck. It is conveyed by rail to a selected rail-head near to the ultimate destination, where the haulier or his local agent must unload, sort and distribute by road.
That is the essential operative part of the scheme. There is provision to ensure that the haulier retains the goodwill of his customers in the following. The haulier is to deal direct with his customers; all traffic by rail is to be invoiced direct to the haulier and not to his customers and the trucks are to be forwarded in the name of the haulier. Hauliers are advised, wherever possible, to accept consignments at "owner's risk" and, failing that, to have their "goods in transit "insurance policies revised in accordance with the altered methods of transport. They should also, in respect of certain classes of traffic, recommend their customers to improve and strengthen methods of packing, whenever it seems likely that the extra handling involved in this road-cumrail transport is likely to result in damage to the goods.
' • Provisions that Have Special Significance • There are two other provisions, both of which are peculiarly significant.
First, rail-heads are to he selected, not in large towns, but in places reasonably near large towns; banking facilities will be provided wherever possible.
Second, hauliers are warned that railway wagons are not so capacious as road vehicles, and that they must not expect to get more than four tons into one truck.
The first objection to the plan has already been mentioned, namely, that the railways have already enough to do as it is, and cannot accept any additional bulk of traffic. In some stations, I understand, notices are posted to the effect that none but priority traffic can be accepted.
Provision for banking is only offered provisionally. It is an accepted fact amongst those who are in a position to know that, except in rare instances where there is very little traffic of any kind, and, therefore, not likely to be of use in any event, the banking facilities are as choked as the railways themselves. There will be little or no facilities available for hauliers.
Thirdly, the hauliers concerned. are not, as to many of them, equipped to deal with collection and delivery services. They own and operate only vehicles of maximum capacity, Chiefly of the sixor eight-wheeled class. The use of such vehicles for C. and D. work would be costly in the extreme and out of all proportion to the revenue earned, that apart from their extravagance in fuel consumption while engaged on work for which they are totally unfitted. In many cases, too, collection and delivery points are inaccessible to vehicles of this size.
• Absurdity of the Whole Scheme • Lastly, and this condition amounts to a reductio ad absurdum of the whole scheme: three 10-ton railway wagons will be needed for every 10-ton lorry which is taken off the road. That alone necessitates liberation, from present presumably urgent service, of 5,000 to 6,000 railway trucks. Of that aspect of the matter more anon.
Meanwhile, to show that the restriction on these trunk services is unnecessary certain basic figures are essential to my argument. I take them from that particularly excellent publication, issued by the S.M.M.T., "The Motor Industry of Great Britain." Of heavy vehicles registered during 1938, there were 2,060 petrolengined and 1,839 oil-engined, all over six tons unladen weight, which is all that we need consider in relation to trunk services. The total consumption of petrol for the same year is estimated at slightly less than 1,500,000,000 gallons, and of oil fuel 101,000,000 gallons.
Of the total of 3,899 heavy vehicles one-third, and that third practically all of the petrol-engined type, are operated locally by brewers, flour-millers, sand-andballast merchants and hauliers, say 1,333 vehicles, leaving 2,566 on long-distance haulage. Of that total probably 1,800 are oil-engined and 766 petrol. Some diminution of the total is possible by efficient co-operation and elimination of one-way loading, reducing the petrol-engined figure to 200.
• Mileage Totals Under War Conditions • The average mileage covered, under war-time conditions and traffic demand, will not exceed 30,000 per vehicle, i.e., a total vehicle mileage of 54,000,000 on oil fuel and 6,000,000 on petrol.
Assuming an average consumption of 16 m.p.g. of the ail-engined machine and 8 m.p.g. by the petroldriven chassis, I arrive at -the following figures for fuel needs per annum. In the case of fuel oil, 3,375,000 gallons, and in the case of petrol 750,900 gallons. That is to say, of the total normal consumptions only 3* per cent. is needed in respect of oil fuel, and actually only 0.005 per cent., -or one two-thousandth part of the total, in the case of petrol.
No unbiased individual can possibly suggest that we cannot afford to allow trunk services to operate, in view of those figures.
I propose to deal with another aspect of this subject and to emphasize the fact that, merely from the point of view of availability of rolling stock, the present restrictions are impracticable, if not actually a danger to the country.