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Memorandum of the Mansion House Association

22nd March 1932, Page 54
22nd March 1932
Page 54
Page 54, 22nd March 1932 — Memorandum of the Mansion House Association
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Which of the following most accurately describes the problem?

THE Mansion House Association on Transport has now sent to the Minister of Transport a detailed memorandum which is a valuable contribution to the cause of road transport. By reason of consideration of space, we can, in this digest, allude only to leading points.

Comparing the years 1924 and 1930, the deficit in passenger traffic on the railways is stated by them to be 13.2 million pounds, and in merchandise (excluding coal, coke and livestock) 4.3 millions.

Although the bulk of this loss is in connection with passenger receipts, the railways state that they do not propose to lay any proposition before the Minister in respect of fares or the regulation of passenger road traffic, almost the whole case being directed against goods road haulage.

The figure of 4.3 millions makes no allowance whatever for the abnormal depression in industry. It is not denied that there are certain losses due to road competition, but they are considerably less than the figures put forward by the railways when they are confined to hauliers in direct competition with the railways.

The railways were slow in realizing the correct interpretation of "service." Their shortcomings in the direction of " home delivery" and their repeated labour disputes hastened the development of traders' own road fleets.

Between 1919 and 1920, London traffic for delivery to such places as Beckenham, Romford, Croydon, etc., was actually being sent by rail and collected and delivered by separate vehicles, with an additional handling at each end, and the railways cannot reasonably contend that this traffic should be railborne to-day.

Railways Refused Short-distance Traffic.

About the same time the companies began to refuse to accept short-distance traffic, including that to places almost 20 miles away ; so trading and distributing organizations were forced to acquire commercial vehicles, the pressure being applied by the railways. These fleets have grown and cater for traffic that the railways never handled, i.e., that previously carted by horses, plus much which the railways drove away. Increases in ' railway rates have also encouraged the trader to operate his own motor vehicles and to attend the field of distribution. Also the rapid change in marketing conditions has demanded door-to-door transport, which the motor vehicle alone can give.

The railways were continually enforcing regulations demanding heavier packing, or excusing themselves from risk, which was more costly to the trader, whereas marketing conditions in many trades were steadily advancing towards the elimination of the packing and outer package to reduce production and distribution costs. Many trades marketing liquid products are turning over to bulk delivery by convenient road tankers. The railways cannot hope entirely to regain this traffic.

Out of the 350,000 commercial vehicles now operating, it is estimated that between 70 and 80 per cent, are owned or worked in the exclusive service of particular makers and distributors. By requesting the Government to place additional taxation upon road transport, it would appear that the railways desire to penalize road vehicles by legal restriction and taxation until ownership becomes intolerable.

The position of the railways is not worse than that of the heavy industries, agriculture and shipping, nor than that of most foreign railways. Decreasing returns are general throughout the world.

Some of the contentious figures in the memorandum are being broadcast in a pamphlet entitled " Fairplay for the Railways." In this it is stated'. that the loss from road competition is not less than £16,000,000 in net revenue for the year 1930, as compared with the year 1924, and that this is really an under-statement of the total loss.

Now the standard net revenue for the whole of the railways is approximately 151,000,000 per annum, and the public is asked to believe that, after allowing for road competition existing in 1924, the railways lost, in 1930, a traffic which would have yielded to them a net revenue of at least n36 £16,000,000. No attempt is made by the railways to prove the total loss of gross receipts which is necessary to yield such revenue.

It is suhm. eted that Motor vehicles below 2 tons unladen are not the class competing with the railways. On longdistance haulage, against which the railways are particularly incensed, 10-ton units and 5-ton units with trailers are the only vehicles which can economically compete for the major portion of this traffic. The number weighing—over 2 tons unladen was about 63,700 in 1924. For-1930, the figure Is 79,150, so that the increase in the number of vehicles between these dates is approximately 15,500.

According to the Final Report of the Royal Commission on Transport, it is estimated that 80 per cent, of roadborne goods is carried in traders' own vehicles and that only 20 per cent.lis conveyed by hauliers. In 1924, the railways owned 2,127 commercial vehicles, but in 1930 this expanded to• 4,313, an increase of 2,186. There is little doubt that 1,500 of these additional vehicles are of over 2 tons unladen weight and can be deducted from the aforesaid 15,500 additional goods vehicles, leaving a balance of under 14,000 such vehicles for the year 1930 as compared with 1924.

Only 2,800 Extra Vehicles in 1930.

Adopting the analysis of 20 per cent, being owned by the haulier, this shows 2,800 extra vehicles for the hauliers. These constitute the only, additional vehicles in competition with the railways in 1930. Assuming the average gross receipts to be £900 per vehicle per annum, this represents 12,500,000, which is less than half the figure given by the railways. From this must be deducted the working costs, to arrive at the actual loss in net revenue.

It is submitted that the private trader has an absolute right to operate vehicles in his own service and thus maintain complete control of the distribution of his goods, eliminating the expense of packing, risk of damage and pilferage, and giving the advantages of a minimum of handling and direct contact with the customer. The traders consider that the operation, of directly owned motor delivery fleets is a question for individual discretion.

In dealing with inequality of burden, it is submitted that the steel-tyred, horse-drawn vehicles (of which the railway companies own 31,000) do r more damage to the roads traversed than motors weighing less than 1 ton, and which account for about 140,000 out of approximately 348,000 goods vehicles licensed in 1930.

The railways' memorandum suggests that the whole maintenance, policing and signalling of the roads should fall upon the users in proportion to their use. The roads are open to all, including pedestrians, cyclists, horse-drawn vehicles (amongst them the 31,000 owned by the railways) and if the suggestion be carried to its logical conclusion every class of road user must pay an appropriate levy. The railways have absolute control over their track. Road users have few free rights, and are bound by legislation.

The railways' memorandum attributes approximately £10,000,000 loss to road competition, including the private car. The railways, however, hold large financial interests in many road operating companies, and much of the revenue is merely transferred to another avenue of railway interest.

Road passenger transport has cultivated and encouraged the growth of a new desk of tourist and excursion business, and has done much to improve travel comfort.

Roads are necessary to the State and are of • prime importance to the railways, a large proportion of the general merchandize of which has to pass over the roads, either for collection or delivery, or both. The road system would have to be reasonably maintained even if there were no motors.

Therefore, the test seems to be the difference between the pre-motor cost of roads (increased to the general present-day level of prices and labour) and the upkeep to-day. This gives a sum of £30,800,000, whilst road transport pays £56,800,000, and, therefore, is taxed in excess of road upkeep costs, to the extent of 126,000,000, and the position indicates that some amelioration of the present burden is justifiable.