What Ashton Davies Has Not Told Us
Page 61
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HAVE waited patiently for the 'publication of the mass of correspondence which I anticipated would follow the letter of Mr. Ashton Davies, dealing with the question of railway monopoly, printed in The Commercial Motor dated April 9. But, save for that diehard, Mr. Walter Gammons, the " big guns" of road transport have remained strangely silent. Again, therefore, it is left to one who is only an unhappy spectator of this iniquitous goods-vehicle licensing " racket " to make a belated reply.
Mr. Ashton Davies does not deny that the railways desire, and intend to have, a partial monopoly; indeed, in view of his admission in the Metropolitan Traffic Court, it would be futile to do so. Apparently, however, he is so alarmed by the imputation of a desire for total monopoly that he is willing to enter the enemy's camp in order to repudiate the charge.
Little by Little.
The part before the whole is, of course, typical of railway strategy. Admission of the larger claim would inevitably hurt the railways in their tenderest spot—public opinion. The abstraction of a fair-sized slice of road-transport business could probably be accomplished without unduly ruffling the feelings of the general public; but it is essential for the railways' game that the public should not be alarmed until they are in a position to present a fait accompli. Naturally, it will then be too late.
Appreciation of this point gives us an easy clue to the desire of Mr. Ashton Davies to play the part of grandmother, so that little Red Riding Hood shall not be Unduly frightened—before dinnertime. Although Little Red Riding Hood was old-fashioned, she was a Young woman of considerable perception; she discerned a nose, larger and more predatory than that possessed by her grandmother. I also see a nose.
Mr. Ashton Davies asks that the matter, presented according to his methods, should be viewed in perspective, but whence I am standing the perspective tends only to enhance the proportions of that generous nose. It is not the timid, retrousse nose that Mr. Davies's letter would seem to suggest, but a large, well-equipped organ, which already smells the beginnings of a good dinner. Let us examine this suggested railway tit-bit.
In the first place, Mr. Davies misleadingly states that there are 157,000 vehicles engaged in public haulage. What he means by "public haulage" I do not know. If he refers to public carriers' vehicles, the number has increased by some 57,000 vehicles since the Licensing Authorities' First Annual Reports were published. I think this hardly possible.
In the reports issued by the Licensing Authorities in March, 1936, the number of vehicles owned by public carriers is given as 100,000. As this is the only class of licence holder that would be affected by any restriction on long-distance transport, Mr. Ashton Davies will, I am sure, forgive me if I omit the 55,000 Blicence vehicles which he has apparently included.
He then reluctantly agrees that 20,000 might be the number of those vehicles engaged on trunk-route traffic and the business of which he proposes to abstract. As Mr. Davies does not produce any evidence that will upset this figure, I think we may take it for granted. The railways, therefore, make an open and undisguised claim to deprive of their livelihood no less than 20 per cent. of all public carriers!
Railways' Huge Road Fleets.
This, however, does not complete the picture, for we have as yet made no mention of the huge fleets of Alicence vehicles owned and operated by the railways and their subsidiary companies. These must first be deducted from the gross number of A-licence vehicles before we arrive at a true picture of the position.
At the end of 1935 the railways owned 8,300 road vehicles. If, therefore, we start with this figure, take into consideration their persis
tent and monotonous successes in the traffic courts during the past year, and the vehicles owned by their subsidiary companies, a round figure of at least 10,000 would not appear to be unduly high.
If, therefore, Mr. Ashton Davies reaches his first objective the railways will remove, without compensation, 20,000 of the 90,000 A-licence vehicles owned by independent operators, or 221per cent, of the traffic of all independent public carriers.
When the smoke of battle subsides, and provided that they do not further augment their own road fleets, the railways will be incontrol of no less than 12i per cent. of all public carriers' vehicles. You will agree, I think, that Mr. Ashton Davies has quite a good nose—for business.
Restricting A-licensees.
Let us, however, look just a little farther than our own noses, or even his nose. If a monopoly of trunkroute traffic be ultimately secured, some restriction will have to be placed on A-licence operators to prevent them from continuing this class of business. In other words, the Alicence holder will receive a kind of super B licence.
No doubt he will be promised immunity from further restriction— only to be browbeaten, pin-pricked and betrayed, as have been the unfortunate B-licence holders. We all know the process of self-extermination which is going on among B. licensees. This, of course, would be vastly accelerated by the competition of restricted A-licence holders.
To put it in plain language, if the railways secure control of trunkroute traffic, it will not be the beginning, but the end, of the battle for independence on the part of the roadtransport industry.
When Mr. Ashton Davies has secured his controlled monopoly of trunk-route traffic, some new, vast combine will, I suppose, be formed.
If, when this comes to pass, certain sections of the employees of this new colossus of rationalization seek a similar remedy to that of the busmen, I wonder whether the Licensing Authorities of the day will grant temporary long-distance permits to the few restricted hauliers still operating, and whether the latter will be foots enough to apply for
them? A.D.-J.