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Page 148
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Under
water sleight of hand
HALF a century ago a favourite subject for debating societies was the case for and against a Channel tunnel. It was considered that the arguments on each side were almost equally balanced so that the vote at the end would fairly reflect the skill of the debaters.
The points in favour of a tunnel must have seemed stronger at that time when the railways were still the predominant form of transport. With the development of road and air transport one might have supposed that the arguments on the other side would long ago have prevailed. Instead of this the Anglo-French investigation a few years ago into the question which had defied decision for a century or more recommended that a tunnel be built. This recommendation was accepted by the governments of both countries.
Some sleight of hand may be detected here. The joint working party was not asked to become a high-powered debating society examining simply the pros and cons of a tunnel. It was asked to compare two specific projects, one for a tunnel and the other for a bridge. It is true that its terms of reference would have allowed it also to consider whether a fixed link of any kind promised any advantage over the established means of crossing by sea or air. The report published in 1963 makes it clear that this point interested the working party less than the settlement of the rival claims of tunnel and bridge.
Few facts
The reason was undoubtedly that there are few facts and figures about the future development of cross-Channel traffic. There are so many unknown quantities including the future relationship between Britain and Europe, progress with new modes of transport such as hovercraft, drive-on ferries and container ships, and the construction of new ports and terminals. The impression left is that the working party found the uncertainties and gaps all too much for them and preferred to tread where at least the ground seemed to be firmer.
Outside pressures helped to direct them along this primrose path. There were two powerful groups of interests promoting the tunnel and the bridge. Each side had given considerable publicity to its case. Only scattered voices were heard to protest that both parties were wrong and that the whole idea of a fixed link was a mistake.
Road operators for the most part did not join this thin chorus. Many of them actively supported the proposal for a bridge. By comparison with the tunnel scheme it certainly seemed far more imaginative and in line with modern thinking. It was to be a wide structure capable of taking several lines of traffic in each direction. Trains would run at a separate level and there was obvious scope for pipelines, cables and similar methods of communication.
Approval for a bridge was widely taken to mean also approval of the principle of a fixed link. There would have been difficulty in sustaining a logical case for a bridge or nothing. It would have seemed too blatant an expression of a vested interest. As a consequence the bridge party was in a dialectical trap. It had made its bid and had to stand by it.
As was clear from the start the tunnel will be railway-dominated. Only trains will use it. Cars and commercial vehicles up to a certain size will be ferried through on fiat trucks. Much of the traffic will be on containers which will often be brought to the tunnel depot by road transport. Whatever method is adopted the British and French railways are bound to play the leading part.
The dangers have not been overlooked by the representatives of road users. The British Road Federation has had a special study group working in co-operation with the Union Routiere de France. A memorandum to the Ministry of Transport a year ago summed up the growing uneasiness. Similar proposals went to the French Government.
The memorandum asked for an assurance that the Anglo-French operating company which is to lease the tunnel and terminals would not be predominantly a railway concern. It was pointed out that the railways would inevitably be working the tunnel as sub-contractors to the company and would thus have a built-in advantage as users of the tunnel. The memorandum suggested that this advantage should be counteracted by safeguards to ensure that the railways do not in fact enjoy preferential treatment to the detriment of other users.
The charges
Charges for using the tunnel, said the memorandum, should not be manipulated so as to discriminate unfairly in favour of long-distance rail traffic and against the interests of road vehicles coming to the terminals under their own power. Users must also be protected against time-tables which would make it inconvenient for them to send their traffic otherwise than by rail.
Concern was expressed at the possible effects of industrial disputes particularly if forecasts were correct of a considerable reduction in the availability of other cross-Channel services once the tunnel had been built. The memorandum suggested that among other things the Anglo-French treaty and statutes should contain provisions similar to those enforced upon the gas, electricity and water supply industries which prevent strikes without advanced warning.
As was to be expected the BRF concluded by pointing out what access roads would have to be built before the tunnel opened. There must be a motorway from Wrotham in Kent to the tunnel entrance, the South Orbital motorway would have to be completed and there should be sections of the North Orbital road and D Ring road linking M1 and M4. The Union Routiere was left to put the case for new roads in Northern France, including motorway links towards Paris, Belgium and Germany and an expressway south to Rouen.
Disadvantages
Many of these points would have applied equally to a bridge or to any other fixed link. The disadvantages are clear from any map of the Continent. The shortest crossChannel route lies between Dover and Calais but is used by only a small proportion of Continental traffic. It lies off the main tourist route even to France and through France to Spain and Portugal and it is equally out of the way for traffic to Belgium, Holland, Germany and beyond, let alone Scandinavia.
If the tunnel fulfils the hopes of its sponsors—and if it does not there is no point in building it—an unprecedented volume of traffic will be drawn through the congested London conurbation to the South-East coast with obviously unfavourable effects on trade and industry in the North and the development areas. Every ton of this traffic will have to pass through France, a country that has not always shown itself particularly helpful to British carriers. Whatever safeguards may be written into the treaty the risk of an unfriendly reception cannot entirely be put on one side. Certainly there would be little scope for retaliation.
It is now over four years since Mr. Ernest Marples announced the decision to go ahead with the tunnel project. Progress has not been unduly rapid. The latest move has been the proposal by Mr. Richard Marsh to add to the already dropsical Transport Bill a new clause which would enable him to set up a Channel tunnel planning council. It would have the task of dealing with the necessary administrative and financial arrangements and formulating operational requirements.
Consideration of the new clause will not provide the opportunity of discussing the general principle of the Channel crossing. Nevertheless, it is time that road operators as well as the Government took another look at the subject. Whatever enthusiasm may have been generated at the time of the tunnel-bridge controversy has long since. evaporated.
In a period of financial stringency it is increasingly realized that the substantial investment which will have to be made in the tunnel and related schemes such as the road approaches might be better spent on other road schemes and in encouraging the development of new ports, new contacts on the Continent and new methods of getting the traffic there efficiently and economically.