A SELLER'S DUTY TO HIS CUSTOMER.
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Conditions Implied on the Sale of a Motor Vehicle as to Fitness for a Particular Purpose.
THERE are usually a great many conditions and warranties implied on the sale of a motor vehicle, as indeed in the case of the sale of any other article, but there is one particular condition to which attention might be drawn, because of its extreme importance and its likelihood of being overlooked.
The condition in question is the one as to the fitness of the vehicle sold for some particular purpose; and if this condition be broken, the purchaser would be entitled to avoid the contract of sale and to recover the purchase price, if paid in respect of the vehicle in question.
Such conditions are implied by virtue of the provisions of s. 14 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, • which provides that, "where the buyer, expressly or by necessary implications, makes known to the seller Om particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller's skill oe judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the course of the seller's business to supply (whether lie be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
Three conditions must therefore be satisfied before the above provision will apply, viz.:— (1) The buyer must make known to the seller whether expressly or impliedly, the particular purpose for which the goods are required ; (2) The buyer must intend to rely on the seller's skill or judgment ; and
(3) The goods in question must be of a description which it is in the course of the seller's business to supply, it being immaterial however whether the seller is the manufacturer or not.
Reliance Upon the Skill and Judgment of the Seller.
It is to be noted that it is not in every case in which the buyer informs the seller of the particular purpose or purposes for which he requires the vehicle, that the implied condition of the fitness of the vehicle for the particular purpose will arise. The buyer must go farther and show that the circumstances were such that he was relying on the seller's skill or judgment, that the vehicle will answer his particular purpose; and it is especially difficult to pin the seller with liability, where the buyer purchases the vehicle under Its usual trade name, as is more often the ease.
A good instance, however, in which the seller was held liable is afforded by the recent case, Baldry v. Marshall (1925, 1 K.B. 260). That case concerned the sale of a certain type of touring car, but the principles which are thereby illustrated would of course equally apply to the sale of commercial vehicles as Well. In that case the buyer informed the sellers that he wanted a fast car, which would be flexible and easily managed, and which would be comfortable and suitable-for the ordinary purposes of a touring car.
Conditions and Warranties.
A car of the particular make which the Defendants said they thought would satisfy the plaintiff's requirements, was supplied to the plaintiff with the usual manufacturer's guarantee, there being a stipulation, however, that the said. guarantee, if accepted, , "expressly excludes any other guarantee or warranty, statutory or otherwise." The car after delivery, although perfect in every other respect, was found not to be a comfortable car or suitable for touring purposes, as the plaintiff had said he required the car to be. On this ground accordingly the plaintiff rejected the car and brought an action to
rescind the contract and to recover the purchase money he had paid. It was held that he was entitled to do so as he was to be deemed to have shown to the defendants that he was relying on their skill and judgment as to the satisfactoriness of the car for the particular purposes in question. The Court further held that the defendants were not protected by the clause in the guarantee providing that the guarantee, if accepted, was to exclude any other guarantee or warranty, on the ground that the requirement that. the car should be comfortable and suitable for touring purposes was a condition and not a warranty, and did not therefore come within the scope of the above provision in the guarantee; and between a warranty and a condition there is a recognised and important difference in law.
Had, of course, the defendants in the above case so worded the above, provision in the guarantee as to exclude expressly any conditions as well, there can be no question that the defendants could not have been held liable.
One further important point was considered in the above case, viz., whether the defendants could rely on the proviso to es. 14 (1) 20 so as to exclude any condition on their part as to the fitness of the vehicle for any of the particular purposes for which it was stated to be required.
The Question of a Condition of Fitness.
According to the above proviso, where there is a contract for the sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name, no condition as to the fitness of the goods, for any particular purpose, will be implied. It is important to note that in Baldry v. Marshall the vehicle was described in the contract of sale by its trade name, but the Court held that this fact did not prevent the sale from not being a sale of an article under its trade name for the purposes of the above proviso so as to exclude the condition as to fitness for a particular purpose.
The law on this point will be found to have been well stated by Bankes LI in that case, who said (at PP. 266, 267) :—" The mere fact that an article sold is described in the contract by its trade name does not necessarily make the Sale a sale under a trade name. Whether it is so or not depends upon the circumstances. I may illustrate my meaning by three different cases. First, where a buyer asks a seller for an article which will fulfil some particular purpose, and in answer to that request the seller sells him an article by a well-known trade name, there, I think it is clear the proviso ideas not apply. Secondly, where the buyer, says to the seller, " I have been recom
mended such and such an article "—mentioning it by its trade name—" will It suit my particular purpose?" naming the purpose, and therefore the seller sells it without more ado, there again I think the proviso has no application. But there is a third case where the buyer says to a seller, "I have been recommended so
and so "—giving its trade name—" as suitable for the particular purpose for which I want it. Please sell -it to me." In that case I think it is equally clearthat the proviso would apply and that the implied condition of the thing's fitness for the purpose named would not arise. In my opinion the test of an article having
been sold under its trade name within the meaning of the proviso is : ," Did the buyer specify it under its trade name in such a way as to indicate that he is satisfied, rightly or wrongly, that it will answer his purpose, and that he is not relying on the skill or judgment of the seller, however great that skill or judgment may be?"