`New policies on public transport'
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OVER THE NEXT 10 to 20 years public transport undertakings would have to regard as their primary task the taking of people to work in cities and industrial complexes. This was stated by Mr. J. H. Locke, Under Secretary (Road Transport) MoT, in his paper on "New policies for public transport." He believed the limit to the number who could travel by car to city centres would be reached in the foreseeable future.
Mr. Locke said that public transport had either to regard itself as a social service or believe that there were services which would compete successfully with private transport.
Main defect
A main defect today, he said, was a lack of overall planning with no single authority, except in London, responsible for bus and rail services. Bus services were divided between undertakings within boundaries which now made little sense for transport; nobody was responsible for the economic use of road or rail facilities or the siting of bus stations in relation to rail or the integration of bus services.
Almost certainly more money needed to be invested in the industry, while the relation between investment on roads and public transport needed more consideration than it got now, even from the largest local authorities.
The complications caused by trying to reconcile the different financial and social interests of different operators in a conurbation caused trouble. Many so-called "coordination" agreements were more like market-sharing arrangements than an attempt to produce the most satisfactory public services.
Mr. Locke thought that the present relations between municipal, State-owned and private operators lead to further confusion in an already confused situation. We had yet to get the right framework for choice between the use of a car or public transport in congested areas; appropriate charges were not reflected in the relative costs of using cars in one situation rather than another. And city congestion often affected the balance of attraction away from public to private transport.
The proposed PTAs would ensure integrated, adequate and economic public transport over coherent areas. They would place responsibility, said Mr. Locke, on the local communities for deciding the type of transport they wanted and how it should be 'financed.
The Minister was only trying to extend a long accepted principle of responsible local authorities and would not control their activities. When the PTA had developed plans sufficiently they would take over from the Traffic Commissioners the control of bus services within areas. Broad policy control would be separated from actual operation which would be vested in a corporate body.
Full financial control would exist in the PTAs and precepts on local rates would, therefore, only arise if an authority decided on policies (reflected in the annual budget) which entailed running at a deficit. If the Authority did not like the way the executive was carrying out its job, then they would use the power of "hiring and firing".
One criticism
One criticism made of PTAs, he said, was that they were being based on securing economies by amalgamating existing bus operators. That was not so, as the Ministry had been analysing the effect of the size of an undertaking on its profitability. Among non-municipal operators no correlation had been found between size and profitability. There was no reason for any difference in costs between a 300and a 1,000-bus undertaking. But there seemed to be a tendency to exaggerate the possible diseconomics of scale in bus operations.
It was thought that companies losing profitable routes would be seriously hurt financially—that they would be left with unprofitable rural services which would then be difficult to maintain. Mr. Locke did not think this was a long-term problem as in time the whole country—including country areas —would be covered by PTAs.
Substantial grants
Substantial Government grants would be made to public transport, mainly directed at railway improvements and extensions. But they would extend also to the fixed investments of bus operators where local transport could be improved. Transport studies would be made in conurbations, including the use of new forms of tracked vehicles and railway improvement.
It might be found that investment in new systems would be more worth while than additional expenditure on urban roads. Mr. Locke mentioned the Manchester Rapid Transit Study, the Central Manchester rail tunnel and the Liverpool inner loop.
Despite the interest in railways, they would only be justified where there was enough traffic to justify the cost. Buses would still be the main form of public transport. But re-equiptnent had to be faster and the introduction of one-man buses speeded-up.
Better buses needed
Also better buses were needed to compete with cars: special rush-hour types of buses were needed. Economies could be obtained by adopting a standard design. New methods of operation ought to be investigated, such as using buses on fixed tracks—combining the flexibility of the bus with the reliability of the railways.
Mr. Locke was opposed to crosssubsidization of bus services and he was not convinced that bus undertakings had made sufficient efforts to analyse the structure of their costs. The conventional system of comparing receipts on a route with average costs per mile over the whole undertaking did little more than indicate areas where a detailed examination should be made.
Economic tensions What he had said about cross-subsidization pointed strongly against flat fares and except in smaller towns were not possible; a flat fare of more than 6d would create economic tensions.
Perhaps, public transport should not be expected to pay, commented Mr. Locke. There had been much discussion in recent years on subsidies to support public service. They could only be justified if it were clear that they could achieve specific benefits.
Mr. Locke's feeling was that general operating subsidies were not likely to be of value. He feared that they were likely to reduce management effectiveness. Such subsidies to public transport were best given in a specific form which was least likely to encourage sloppy management and which could be used as a stimulus for desirable developments.