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Wanted A Simple Rates Schedule

15th May 1942, Page 15
15th May 1942
Page 15
Page 16
Page 15, 15th May 1942 — Wanted A Simple Rates Schedule
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Which of the following most accurately describes the problem?

THE essence of road transport, the characteristic which confers upon it that pre-eminence over other forms of transport which so commends it to all traders, is its directness and simplicity. Nothing should be done which diminishes that advantage. The importance of preserving that especial quality should always be kept in mind.

This fundamental requirement is being overlooked by the majority of those in whose hands the destiny of the industry now lies. They are accepting as inevitable a classification of merchandise which is patterned on that of the railways: they have drafted "conditions of service" which are so like those of the railway companies as to be almost indistinguishable from them. Also, ironically, these two things, classification and conditions, as they are at present, are those above all others which the railway companies would like to be without. The railway companies' "Classification of Merchandise," built up laboriously over many years, hangs, to-day, like a millstone around the necks of the traffic managers, whilst road transport, which needs no such classification, is blindly manufacturing a similar • yoke for its own neck.

Road Liberty Must Not be Sacrificed There is much talk of a fellowship with the railways; of burying the hatchet, of ensuring that the bad old pre-war days of strife will never return. It is good to know that, but if the freedom from strife is to be purchased by the sacrifice of the liberty of the road, then the cost will be much too high.

The Road and Rail Central Conference announces that the "streams of traffic" with which it has dealt now run into four figures. In other words, there are thousands of them, and it expects to be congratulated. For our part, we are appalled at the thought.

We have consistently maintained and do still assert that, so far as rates for road transport are concerned, there is no need for the scheduling of vast numbers of "streams of traffics." These rates can be assessed by means of a simple straightforward tariff, based on cost of service, plus profit. The former is already known: the latter a matter / for agreement. Differences between traffics all boil down to a question of terminals, and a simple scale for the latter will suffice to cover all but a small list of extreme and rare kinds of goods.

We often hear it said, by " road" members of panels of the Road and Rail Conference, that the railway men are experienced in rate fixing and that they (the road members) are learning a good deal about the subject. This is, to put it bluntly, rubbish. The rail men know all about rates for railway traffic, but nothing about those for road haulage. The road members, never having had a rates structure of their own, appear to be swallowing all that is offered to them by the rail members, with the result that the whole scheme of rates fixture is rail biased.

Hasty Condemnation of Simple Schedules When, therefore, someone produces a simple schedule, such as that which seems likely to go down in road-transport history as the Leeds Schedule, the Advisory Committee, which is largely composed of Road and Rail Conference members, immediately condemns it, and does so with indecent haste, much too quickly for it to have been given serious Consideration. In thus condemning it, the Committee offers no alternative and puts up no constructive criticism. Presumably, the thousands of streams of traffic comprise its solution of the problem.

We do not presume to say that the rates in the Leeds Schedule are those which should be established: we do not suggest the contrary. We do emphatically opine, however, that some such schedule is precisely what the industry needs at the present juncture. At the very least the Leeds Schedule is what it purports to be; a rates table. If the Advisory Committee rejects it, then it should produce an. alternative, and do so with the same speed as that which brought the Leeds Schedule into being. At present the whole rates question is in abeyance; the charges being made are chaotic, varying by as much as 50 per cent, in many cases, and sometimes more than that, for equivalent service.

It is up to the industry to produce a schedule of its own, free from the guidance or influence of .03 the railways. If it does not do so, and quickly, it will find itself, after the war, either in .a worse state than before—if that be possible—or utterly dependent upon the railways.

American Scheme for Road and Rail Division of Function

AN interesting suggestion to aid the general 'transport system by road and rail has been put forward in the U.S.A. It is pointed out that the shortage of transport which threatens the United States might easily result in the loss of the war, for it is estimated by American officials that, by midsummer, all road and railway hauling equipment, most of which is already devoted to military or war-production work, will be in use to capacity. Yet, by this time, production will still be far short of its peak, and if, in the succeeding months, the necessary raw materials and finished products cannot be conveyed to and from the factories, the consequences will be most serious.

There is not enough production capacity not already converted to war work to build new railway rolling stock. A similar restriction applies to the construction of new self-propelled vehicles.

The solution put forward, therefore, is to devote all railway facilities in the country to full-truck, through-haul work, which the railways are primarily organized to handle. Road transport • would then take over all the more localized work and smaller consignments, in addition to the varied and indispensable services which it is already rendering. It is considered that this solution would add nearly 20 per cent. to the national transport capacity—possibly the difference between victory and ,def eat. As an explanation of how these ideas would be Carried out, it may be 'mentioned that, so far as the railways are concerned, of some 1,700,000 trucks in service, 340,000 are devoted to short hauls, but they handle only 1.4 per cent. (about 15,000,000 tons per year) of the railways' total tonnage. The major portion of these trucks could, therefore, be switched •to capacity operation, when, it is estimated, they could handle 200,000,000 tons per year.

The work suggested for road transport is considered to be its " dish," giving shorter delivery time, minimum handling, door-to-door delivery, co-ordination with factory assembly lines, and other factors, by which the carriers score 100 per cent.

On the other hand, for such work, more capacity by road will be needed to absorb the tonnage taken over from the railways. To obtain this, the necessary ,trailers could easily and rapidly be produced, even in war time, by the many manufacturers, . without diverting too considerable a part of their facilities from direct war work.

Every ton of steel, rubber, etc., used in railwaytruck equiprfient can deal with only 49.1 ton-miles per day, whereas every ton of similar materials employed for trailers can give 412.5 ton-milesapproximately eight times as many. These calculations are derived from reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Association of American Rail Roads.

As to motive power, scores of thousands of light and medium lorries, which are now used to " carry" rather than "pull " their loads, could be converted for the purpose. Presumably many of them would be utilized as tractive units for trailer outfits.