OPERATING OVERSIZE ARTICS
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IN THIS SERIES (CM, January 7 1966) I reported the case before Uckfield magistrates' court when a specialist in the transport of oversized caravans was summoned for using an artic above the permitted length of 13 metres (42ft 7in.). The case arose because although oversized caravans were carried on outward journeys, when stopped the vehicle involved was carrying two caravans each 20ft by 9ft 6in. as a return load.
In dismissing this case the magistrates said that it would appear that the Minister of Transport had recognized that while vehicles coming within the Special Types Order were in use there were times when they should be permitted to carry divisible or smaller loads.
This case was referred to in Q and A November 10 1967. Since then attention has been drawn to a similar case in the Queen's Bench Division before the Lord Chief Justice. A different decision was given but, as is invariably the case, the circumstances were not identical. Moreover, reference has been made to this latter decision in more recent cases to the disadvantage of operators.
Some of these cases have been reported in our news columns, but the subject is so important to many operators that I am giving here in greater detail a report on the case which came before the Queen's Bench Division regarding the use of special type vehicles.
The defendant was the Peak Trailer and Chassis Ltd. which manufactured chassis frames, varying in length from 7ft to 48ft 3in., delivered in their own vehicles to caravan makers. One of these vehicles was an artic with an overall length of 50ft 9in. which, on the occasion in question, was being driven along a road and carrying 15 chassis which were not of exceptional length.
The defendant was charged with using an articulated lorry which exceeded 13 metres in length contrary to Regulation 7 of the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1963 and the case was originally heard before the East Riding of Yorkshire magistrates' court sitting at Howden.
The Load
When stopped at a Ministry of Transport check point at Howden the overall length of the vehicle was 50ft 9in., comprising a tractive unit of 10ft 9in, and a semi-trailer of 40ft. The vehicle was carrying 15 caravan chassis arranged in three stacks each containing five chassis and so obviously a divisible load.
Although an overhang of 3ft 6in. is permitted to all vehicles (and more if the projection is marked), the police officer involved said that though he had seen this vehicle on several occasions he did not recall ever seeing it with an overhanging load.
According to the regulations the maximum permitted length of an articulated vehicle was 13 metres or 42ft 71n. With a deduction of 10ft 9in. for the tractive unit, the maximum length of the trailer was 31ft 10in. Adding 3ft 6in. for the overhang gave a total possible length of load of 35ft 4in.
The chassis manufactured by the defendant varied from 7ft to 48ft 3in. in length plus, in each case, a towbar of 3ft, so giving total length varying from 10ft to Sift 3in. At least 50 per cent of the chassis would be over 30ft.
To deliver these the defendant operated 18 vehicles, including three specially long vehicles. Because the defendant could not store too many chassis at its factory, it delivered as quickly as possible whether or not the appropriate lorry was available for delivery.
On the defendant's behalf it was contended that the firm was not guilty of the offence because of the wording of proviso (b) of regulation 7 (1). In effect this says that an articulated vehicle may exceed 13 metres or 42ft 7in. if it is "constructed and normally used for the conveyance of indivisible loads of exceptional length"— subject also to certain conditions which were satisfied.
List of journeys The list of journeys made by the vehicle between October 1 1964 and October 7 1965 totalled 177. On 77 of these journeys the vehicles carried several chassis each over 3511 4in. in length, which could not, therefore, be carried on a normal vehicle without the excessive overhang requiring special markings.
A further 54 of the journeys involved the carrying of chassis which, if on a vehicle of normal permitted length, would have had to overhang by up to 311 fin. However, the defendant considered it undesirable that its chassis should overhang the carrying vehicle at all.
The defendant argued that because these 131 journeys (that is 77 plus 54) formed a majority of the total 177 journeys in the year, the vehicle was being "normally" used for the conveyance of indivisible loads.
The prosecution argued that "normal" use of the vehicle was when it was used for the 77 journeys only. On the remainder of the journeys a vehicle of normal length could have been used with or without the permitted overhang.
However, the magistrates thought that the load carried by the vehicle on the occasion in question was obviously divisible and could have been divided without undue expense or risk of damage and could therefore have been carried on vehicles of normal length. They consequently rejected the list of journeys as irrelevant to the issue and found the defendant guilty.
The defendant appealed and the question for the opinion of the High Court was whether the magistrates were correct in rejecting the defendant's contention based on the evidence of the list of journeys and in their interpretation of regulation 7 (1) (b).
Giving judgment in the Queen's Bench Division, Mr. Justice Widgery said that while the draughtsman of the regulations, no doubt advisedly, had not attempted to define "exceptional length" he was convinced that a load which would fit entirely within the confines of an articulated lorry of standard length was not a load of exceptional length. But he found it more difficult to make a decision if it protruded to the rear by an amount up to 3ft Gin. (i.e. the permitted overhang), although he was inclined to say that they were not of exceptional length. However, he found it unnecessary to decide that point as on any view 46 of the loads carried out of a total of 177 were not of exceptional length. So one then moved to the second feature of the proviso, namely, the phrase "normal use".
The magistrates may have applied a somewhat too narrow test. They were saying in effect that a vehicle cannot be normally used for the carriage of indivisible loads of exceptional length unless it is always used either on its outward or homeward journey for such a load.
In his view, Mr. Justice Widgery said, the word "normally" had a perfectly ordinary meaning which would be given to it by ordinary people in every day use. Thus a man might say, "1 normally get to the office every morning at 9.30 but this morning I was delayed by fog and only arrived at 10 o'clock".
In using the word "normally" one is referring to something which is in contradistinction to abnormal or exceptional. One could not speak of the use of this vehicle as being normal for loads of exceptional length unless the carriage of other loads is an abnormal or exceptional feature of its life and use.
Most favourable view It seemed to Mr. Justice Widgery that, taking the view most favourable to the defendant, only 46 out of the 177 journeys were ones in which exceptionally long loads were not involved; it was not arguable that journeys with short loads were abnormal or exceptional. In order to show that the use of a vehicle is normally for long loads it was not enough to say that it was so used more often than not.
It was necessary to go much further than that and it would be right in any given case to consider whether the use for other than long loads was so exceptional and abnormal as to justify the conclusion that use for long loads was the normal use.
He found it unnecessary to send this case back to the magistrates because he was satisfied that any magistrate, properly instructed, would be bound to hold that if a vehicle was used for short loads on 46 out of 177 journeys its normal use was not for exceptionally long loads. Accordingly, in his view the magistrates were right—although he based his conclusion on somewhat different reasons and the appeal should be dismissed.
Lord Chief Justice Parker and Mr. Justice Glyn-Jones agreed with this judgment and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
A fuller report of this case is given in the Weekly Law Reports 1967 Vol. 1 from which these extracts were taken.