• Give the Code Some Teeth
Page 41
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The Road Traffic Acts Cannot Interpret All Careless or Dangerous Driving
THE decision of the Court of Appeal in White v. Broadbent and British Road Services, which was reported in The Commercial Motor last week, provides a wider scope for discussion and thought than • even appeared on the surface.
The idea that a driver who, in supposed obedience to the Highway Code, gives a perfectly correct signal to • overtake to a following driver, may find himself held substantially to blame for a collision between the following vehicle and another road user, is one that, at first glance; would startle most laymen.
As was pointed out, however, on the facts of that particular case, it was not too difficult to reconcile common sense with the legal finding, although, unfortunately, that is more than can always be said.
Further consideration of this decision seems to raise two important questions: (a) What effect, if any, could this decision have in criminal, as opposed to civil, proceedings, and (b) is not the whole subject of the Highway Code anomalous in the extreme and overdue for revision?
AS to the first question, it would appear that in logic what is regarded as a sufficiently faulty act by a driver to found civil, responsibility for an accident might well be regarded as sufficiently heinous in certain circumstances to justify criminal liability as well. The difficulty is to see into what particular pigeon-hole of the law of road traffic such an act could be fitted as an "offence."
Incorrect Signal Dangerous It is not difficult to see that a signal incorrectly given as to a driver's intentions is an extremely dangerous act and there would be nothing to prevent the giver of it from being prosecuted for either dangerous or careless driving. Any apparent difficulty where the signal was of the kind given in White's case, i.e.. a "you may pass" signal given by a driver whose vehicle is stationary, is not as real as might be supposed, for it appears probable that it is not necessary to be in motion in order to be guilty of a " driving " offence.
Thus, for the purpose of reporting accidents under Section 22 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, a " driver " is a person who takes a vehicle on to the road and he remains the driver although he may be sitting with the vehicle stationary and the engine stopped. It has also been held in Scotland—where, it should be noted, judicial thought is often a step or two ahead of events in this country-,--that a driver's duty is not confined to making correct signals where a signal might reasonably be expected, he must also see that his signals are correctly understood, in so far as this lies within his power of perception. If he does not so ensure before proceeding to carry out his intentions he may be guilty of careless driving. It would seem but a small step from that principle to apply it to the kind of signal held to be negligent in White's case—albeit that 'was not a signal of intention but a permissive signal.
Code Causes Controversy The second and larger question remains and it is one that has provoked much controversy in recent years— what is the real value of a Highway Code 'that is, in effect, advisory only and carries no penal sanction for its non-observance? At present its only legal signifi7 cance is that, by Section 45(4) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, a failure on the part of any person to observe its provisions does not of itself render that person liable to criminal proceedings of any kind, "but any such failure may in any proceedings, whether civil or criminal, be relied upon by any party to the proceedings as tending to establish or to negative any liability which is in question in those proceedings."
Here is one answer at least to those who allege that the Highway Code—or sothething like it—could never be enforced in the sense•of making breaches of its pró:. visions into offences because of the vagueness of its terms. Much of the Code, in fact, is most precise and could be the basis of a criminal code of traffic law.
The Highway Code was described by counsel for the appellants in White's case as "a trap for the unwary " in view of the Court of Appeal's decision. Certainly the decision makes one realize that Mr. Nugent's statement the same week that the signals authorized by the Code were intended only to show the intentions of a driver was wide of the mark. The Highway Code may not yet be a " trap." but it would require only one or two more authoritative decisions such as the present one to discredit its standing more than is at present the case. As a contribution to law enforcement the Code is largely valueless—why not give it some teeth?