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WE ARE FOR THE DARK

11th November 1966
Page 63
Page 63, 11th November 1966 — WE ARE FOR THE DARK
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Which of the following most accurately describes the problem?

BACK over the years prominent people representing a wide range of interests have used strong language in criticising the proposal for a Channel tunnel. They may soon have no choice but to accept what they dislike and seek the best advantage for themselves. The discussion, at times obscure, between the British and French governments has reached a stage at which it is possible For Mrs. Barbara Castle, the Minister of Transport, and M. Pitani, the French Minister of Equipment, to announce that they have "agreed the lines of a solution."

Most road transport operators would have preferred either no link at all or a Channel bridge. The ultimate likelihood of a tunnel puts them at some disadvantage in that they have played no positive part in the negotiations up to the present stage. The two governments have made progress on their own with the eager co-operation of some of the other interests, including the railways.

Working groups

Each government is now to have a permanent working group with two main functions. The first is to arrange discussions with representatives of private enterprise interested in the actual construction. The two groups will also be studying the structure required for the tunnel operating body, "with particular reference to its relations with the railway undertakings of both countries."

On each aspect road operators should be concerned to see that their opinions have full weight. The plan is to attract private capital, preferably from the international capital market, but the use of public funds would not be excluded. There is an obvious need here for operators to keep in touch with the financial arrangements and with the plans for the work. Once the tunnel is built it will be too late to suggest that its dimensions and other features should have been different.

Even more obvious is the desirability of having some control over the way in which the tunnel is operated. It will be a rail tunnel. Cars, coaches and lorries will be able to travel through it only on special trucks. This in itself will place a physical limit on the type of vehicle which can take passengers or goods to a destination on the Continent. Other considerations include the rates to be charged and the time lost in waiting for a suitable train. These are all matters on which operators will have to keep a close watch.

The joint Anglo-French statement on the subject is to some extent reassuring. It promises that "unrestricted access to the tunnel would be guaranteed, without dis

crimination, to all users". There is also agreement between the Ministers to concert their studies for the provision and development of complementary road and rail access facilities on both sides of the Channel.

Here there is a hint of one of the many possible difficulties. No unequivocal figure has been given or can be given of the cost of the tunnel. in its original report of March 1960 the Channel tunnel study group made an estimate of £130m. The National Plan published in November 1965 lifted the figure to £170m. at 1962 prices. On the most optimistic forecast the project is not likely to be completed much before 1974 by which time the price is bound to have risen still further to something in the region of £200m.

These figures do not take into account the cost of ancillary communications and obviously no clear estimate of them is available. The convinced tunnellers are scornful of the suggestion sometimes made that the very existence of the link will be a magnet drawing immense volumes of traffic from all over the country into one narrow opening. As with so many transport proposals it is impossible to predict what will be the effect of the tunnel. If its attraction proves greater than anticipated a new complex of roads leading to the South Coast will be required.

Extra expenditure

A sudden demand for expenditure for this purpose could disrupt the road programme which has for too long suffered from cuts and deferments. There could be other harmful effects. The ultimate aim of a rational road programme should be a network of communications providing the maximum flexibility and easily adaptable to whatever national and regional plans the Government may have for population shift, the siting of industries and so on.

The tunnel will introduce an element even more rigid than a main line railway. The road system will not be able to disengage itself from the fixed point joining England and France. All highways will increasingly appear to lead to the Channel and will bring down towards it an ever-growing share of the country's trade and industry. It can hardly be denied that the drift to the South so much deplored by the politicians will be encouraged and accelerated once the tunnel is built.

Over the past few years there has developed a healthy process of dispersal. More and more ports away from the South Coast have been expanding often with the assistance of new techniques such as the roll-on-roll-off services. This is very much in line with Government policy. It would at least be interesting to note the official reaction if as a result of the building of the tunnel some of these services languished and even came to an end.

Serious effects

Sea and air freight services across the Channel are almost bound to be seriously affected. It is to goods carriers that the tunnel offers the most serious competition, especially when the destination is at no great distance into France or Belgium. For longer journeys air transport may remain competitive but the road operator may be hard put to it to find an answer to the joint railways if they are able to attract full train loads with the promise or guarantee of overnight delivery to places as far distant as the North of Italy.

All this assumes that the railways will be able to increase their efficiency to the necessary level and that road, sea and air operators will not by 1974 have produced their own answers to the challenge of the tunnel. A remarkable feat of engineering even in these days, one of its drawbacks is that once constructed it can hardly be greatly changed or improved. It will have no resources to call upon when faced with other more sophisticated methods of transport.

Once the novelty has worn off the reaction of passengers may be instructive. Rather than travel through a very long tunnel they may prefer sea or air transport. Even the advantage of the tunnel in bad weather will diminish with the improvements in navigational and other aids. Certainly for longer journeys the tunnel will have little appeal.

Much of this is speculative. What is essential for both passenger and goods operators is that they work together to ensure that their requirements are not overlooked both in the construction of the tunnel and in its functioning.

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