A Matter of Commonsense

11th November 1955, Page 194

11th November 1955

Page 194

Page 194, 11th November 1955 — A Matter of Commonsense

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By Our Legal Adviser

IT has been said that the Law is an I ass. Without in any way subscribing to such a sweeping statement, it does sometimes seem as if, in its effort to achieve certainty, the combined effect of legislation and the courts' interpretation of it is to throw commonsense out ofthe window.

The object of the provisions of Section 21 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, as to the warning, either verbally or by notice, of persons likely to be prosecuted for certain driving offences, is obvious. It is to warn the person concerned so that he can adequately prepare his defence while the memories of his witnesses—and, of course, his own—are still fresh.

In the case, last week, of Sandland v. Neale, the accused had been unconscious in hospital since the accident and c36 visits to the hospital by police officers to warn him of the intended prosecution had been abortive. Accordingly, the police sent by post to his home 'address a written warning notice in the correct form, and within the statutory 14-day period, although they well knew that he was still in hospital and likely to remain there. His wife received the notice, but, perhaps not unnaturally, it did not reach the accused until after the expiration of the 14 days.

The Divisional Court (by a majority) overruled the magistrates' decision that the notice was not properly served, pointing out that what the section referred to was the " sending " of the notice and not its receipt, and that, provided it was sent to wherever it was

likely to come to the accused's attention, that was sufficient.

Obviously, it would be impossible to substitute proof of receipt for proof of sending in such cases—the person might well be away from home. But where the person's whereabouts are known, is there any rhyme or reason in holding that to send it elsewhere, Ivhere a wife or family may or may not open it or pass it on, is as good?

Why should not the police—where the circumstances are perhaps a little unusual—serve duplicate notices of their intention to prosecute? At least that would cover the possibilities, but, failing that, surely the reasoning of the dissenting judge is to be preferred when he said that the simplest 'rule was to send the notice to the address where the accused was living (if known) and at which he would 'probably continue to live for the 14 days?