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Vehicle Fires and the Law

10th September 1954
Page 44
Page 44, 10th September 1954 — Vehicle Fires and the Law
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Which of the following most accurately describes the problem?

by Our Legal Adviser

IT was reported in The Commercial Motor of August 6 that judgment for £122 had been given against the British Transport Commission for loss and damage to goods in transit arising out of a fire caused by a tyre becoming overheated. Fires caused by this and other causes—including the load itself catching fife—are by no means uncommon, and this latest case prompts an inquiry into some of the legal consequences.

Where damage is caused to someone's property, it is normally necessary to prove either that the act causing the damage was a deliberate one or was committed negligently. In many cases, however, it is possible to rely upon the legal doctrine of " res ipsa loquitur "literally, "the thing itself speaks "—to establish liability.

This can be relied upon when • something occurs which is entirely within the control of the defendant and which normally would not happen without someone being to blame.

The classic legal example of this is the old case of the barrel rolling out of a warehouse abutting on to a street and falling upon a passer-by. It has also been held to apply to the case of an unattended vehicle running away downhill from a parked position and causing damage.

In such cases the mere occurrence is enough to establish negligence to discharge the plaintiff's initial burden of proof, and it then rests upon the defendant to show that there is some explanation for the event other than his own negligence. It might be supposed that this rule would apply to outbreaks of fire; that normally fires do not break out without some negligence on someone's part, and that it should be sufficient for the victim of a fire to prove that it started on the defendant's premises or amongst his goods. Such, however, is not the case.

. Negligence Must be Proved The effect of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774—which, despite its title applies to the whole of England and Wales—is that a fire beginning on a man's premises or upon his land is deemed to begin accidentally, and it is therefore necessary to prove that the defendant was negligent, which may not be an easy task, as the facts surrounding the outbreak are almost always entirely within the knowledge of the defendant— if indeed they are within anyone's knowledge. But the negligence of the defendant may be sufficiently proved if it be shown that he was negligent in letting it spread, even if the original outbreak is unexplained.

Thus, where the plaintiff occupied rooms over a garage let to the defendant, and the latter's servant started a car in order to move it and an unexplained fire broke out in the carburetter which resulted in the garage and the plaintiff's rooms being destroyed, the plaintiff was held entitled to recover although there was no negligence in the original outbreak. The servant was negligent, however, in his actions thereafter, for all would have been well if he had turned off the petrol tap leading from the tank to the carburetter; by failing to do this the fire spread.

It is to be noted that the presumption of accident provided for by the Act of 1774 applies where a fire begins on a man's premises or land. Whether it applies

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to fires starting elsewhere, e.g., on the highway, is extremely doubtful, although there appears to be no recent case directly in point. It is suggested that in the case of a vehicle catching fire on a highway and causing damage to adjoining property or 'other vehicles, the defendant would not have the benefit of the 1774 Act, and it would be up to him to show that the fire broke out through no fault of his own.

One point that is certainly worth mentioning in this connection is the position in Scotland where the law is different in that the Act of 1774 does not apply there. Accordingly, where a car owner left his car in a garage for repair and it was there damaged by fire, the Scottish courts held that the primary onus of proof was upon the garage owner to establish at least a prima facie case of accidental fire.

It may also be considered what the position is where damage is caused to the road surface or to the pavement or other parts maintained by the highway authority. This may easily occur through intense heat, and if repairs are necessitated to the road as a result, what can the authority do about it? One remedy that some local authorities have in the past sought to invoke is provided by Section 72 of the Highway Act, 1835, the relevant part of which reads: "If any person . . . shall cause any injury or damage to be done to the said highway or the hedges, posts, rails, walls or fences thereof; or shall wilfully obstruct the passage of any footway; or wilfully destroy or injure the surface of any highway . . . or shall make any fire . . . every person so offending in any of the cases aforesaid shall for each and every offence forfeit and pay any sum not exceeding forty shillings over and above the damage occasioned thereby."

It appears quite clear that in the absence of negligence or "wilfulness," an owner whose vehicle causes damage to the highway or any part thereof cannot be made liable to pay for the damage under this section. In the case of Tunnicliffe v. Pickup, in 1939, a lorry-load of cotton became ignited for some unexplained cause, without any fault on the part of the driver, and this resulted in damage to the road surface, kerbstones and grass verge to the value of £21, which the highway authority sought to recover from the driver under the provisions of the above section.

Cannot be Convicted The magistrates considered that it was immaterial that the driver had acted with promptness in doing all he could to put the fire out and in telephoning for the fire brigade, and had convicted him. On appeal, however, the Divisional Court held that the conviction was wrong, so that it seems from this that where a driver in such a position does all he can to prevent or mitigate the damage resulting from a fire which was not due to his negligence in origin he cannot be convicted and ordered to pay for the damage.

It follows that apart from the importance of exercising due care to prevent a fire starting, it is equally important to prevent its spreading, and that it is even a mistake to let it burn itself out on a deserted stretch of road. Road damage might have to be paid for.


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