1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260 
The railway blues
Page 85
If you've noticed an error in this article please click here to report it so we can fix it.
No, political or sectional opinions should cloud the earnest wish of everyone in this country to see an end to a depressed, ailing national railway system burdened by immense debts, and its replacement by a lively, efficient undertaking.
What are the prospects now laid before us? We are given the vision of a commercially managed, go-ahead concern, with old deficit and interest burdens shed and an attainable financial target to aim for. A clear and separate costing of socially justifiable loss-makers. A realistic investment policy, and a pursuit of worthwhile technology.
Splendid. But things are not always what they seem. Even the White Paper emerged from HMSO with a sympathetic blue cover.
Leaving aside the economics, politics and morality of the enormous write-off and the social subsidies, it is depressing to discover the dearth of detailed plans —and the repetition of old hopes and old remedies. The White Paper says: " it is the Government's firm intention that the Board's capital liabilities should be so adjusted that they have a fair and reasonable prospect of achieving and maintaining a break-even position over the years ahead." And 1971 is the aiming point for this. Yet this same White Paper lists the efforts made as a result of the same stated resolve in 1962. These saved £.115m., which was then swallowed up by wage and price increases that "made nonsense of the aim of the 1962 Act . . . to bring the railways to breakeven point within five years."
Is it so different now? The Board may lose its more onerous financial millstones, but even fierce new management cannot stop wages and prices soaring. Indeed we shall see a levelling up as a result of Mrs. Castle's policies for nationalized transport. She will have to accept, if not encourage, wage assimilation between road and rail workers because of her decision to create the NFC.
And will the new "commercial" railways then be able to kick away the prop of subsidy? They will have lost their potentially profitable Freightliners and will have to rely on being well rewarded (as Lord Shepherd put it—see page 88) for running them on behalf of NFC. So there's a hefty rail profit and an NFC profit to come out of future Freightliner rates. How long will they stay competitive?
It looks as though the haulier may yet have even greater cause to cry "unfair!"