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Aggro on the railways by Janus
UNFAIRLY perhaps, magazines will give ample and frequent space to certain persons and subjects and then use the over-exposure to publicity as a pretext for drawing up a list of bores in which their victims are classified in order of demerit. In the field of transport candidates for high places in such a list would be the Channel tunnel, quantity licensing and the evil-smelling juggernaut.
The annual report of the British Railways Board achieves a distinction of sorts by bringing in all three. It is not surprising to find the railways strongly in favour of the first, mildly approving the second and equally gently disapproving the third.
Although published only a week ago, the report is likely to have been written some time before the general election. Internal evidence supports this assumption. Among other things the report says decidedly that there is "a strong case for the early introduction of quantity licensing". Early or late, there seems not much chance that this particular hope will be fulfilled even in the "certain special cases" of which the report goes on to speak, giving as an example the short-distance haulage of heavy bulk traffics such as aggregates.
In these and other comments the railways show their determination to go over to the attack by using what the report describes as an "aggressive strategy". With an enormous burden of debt removed from them by a stroke of the legislative pen, and with a profit showing on the accounts, they are clearly feeling their feet for the first time in many years.
There is a chafing against whatever restrictions remain. Too much of the time of the Board's officers, says the report, is taken up by the need to discuss in detail and justify individual projects with the officers of the Ministry of Transport. It is admitted that "investment ceilings must necessarily conform to overall' economic policy"; but—engagingly muddying the metaphor—the report indicates the strong feeling of the Board that "within the ceiling" the allocation of investment capital should be regarded as its own responsibility.
With ceilings behaving in this unorthodox way, the Board has every excuse for being upset. The report reflects the Board's queasiness. "The depressing effects of the overall restrictions," it says, "and of variations in the ceilings which tend to disrupt planning, have pushed down railway investment to a level which in the Board's view is quite insufficient to preserve the railways in a healthy state."
The Board also feels that there should be no official control whatever over its subsidiary businesses. Competitive enterprises in public ownership, says the report, should be able to raise funds competitively wherever good commercial opportunities exist.
Mr John Peyton, the new Minister of Transport, to whom the report is perforce addressed, is not likely to have read these remarks with approval. The relatively few firm policy statements he has made so far include the opinion that he would have strong misgivings about major investment in the railways and that State-owned enterprises are not there to take risks with public money. He would evidently be perfectly happy with the low ceiling that seems to be giving the Board a crick in the neck.
With full knowledge of the Minister's views on investment the Board might have been more restrained in expressing its enthusiasm for the Channel tunnel. In the discussions on this egregious project it is sometimes forgotten that the railways will be the organization most likely to win—or lose—financially. The report provides a convenient reminder.
Even before any decision has been reached finally by the British and French Governments the Board has considered itself fully justified, says the report, in "committing further resources to the rail planning effort". The tunnel will clearly offer "an important commercial opportunity" to the railways for the carriage of both passengers and freight.
Almost as an afterthought the report seeks to reassure readers that the tunnel will not be solely for rail. It will be the main link between the road systems of the UK and of Europe "and will employ the railway as a form of moving platform carrying the road vehicles".
According to the report this is technically the most effective and convenient method of providing the link. British and French railways will contract jointly to maintain the service. The railways, says the report, will also be the largest individual customers of the Channel Tunnel Operating Authority and the most important single contributor to its revenues.
In fact, it is difficult to imagine that there will be any other contributors. The tunnel is essentially a railway project and it may be a mistake for the railways to emphasize the ,point at this juncture. Although so far the project is one that apparently the public opinion polls have spared, the general opinion is steadily moving away from an essentially old-fashioned idea.
As if to compensate for the anachronism the report is very much in the Van of progress when it reaches the subject of the environment. There is a pointed passage on the substantial social costs incurred by "almost any proposal for expansion of competing facilities". Examples of such expansion given in the report are motorways, tracked hovercraft and STOL or VTOL aircraft with their associated airfields.
When land use and noise and atmospheric pollution are taken into account, says the report, the more intensive use of the railway network—particularly where this has been electrified—almost always offers the least interference with the environment and the lowest social cost in relation to the benefit obtained. For this statement if for nothing else in the report there will be a warm welcome from the amenity organizations.
On the goods transport side the Freightliner obviously has an important part to play in securing the more intensive use of the railways. As in its previous report the Board again does not conceal its disapproval of the loss of the Freightliner company to the National Freight Corporation. There are hints that it presents an obstacle to close co-operation between the State-owned bodies.
he fast trunk haul is "the essence of
the service", the. Board claims. The
road collection and delivery elements are "ancillary". The present arrangement "reverses what would normally be the commercial relationship between the two partners". In a later passage the report describes the Freightliner network as the "internal counterpart to the 'container revolution' in international trade". It must be developed "aggressively" and, the Board suggests, single-mindedly. "It is doubtful whether the present sharing of interests adequately reflects this need," says the report.
The hint that the railways have a monopoly of aggression may not altogether please other interests. Thumping the table can as easily be a substitute for aggression as a concomitant. Taking into account the vast liquidation of debts and the payment of subsidies for unprofitable services, a working surplus of £56m is no great matter. As compared with 1968 passenger receipts increased from £184m to £205m; and freight receipts from £246m to £256m.
So small a rise in revenue when compared with the almost universal cost increases can hardly be considered satisfactory. In common with all industries the railways are having to meet still further increases during 1970. Even now there is a 25 per cent wage claim to be discussed. There is a long way to go before railway solvency is accepted as a matter of course.