Reckless, dangerous and careless driving
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ALTHOUGH as a class, professional goods and passenger vehicle drivers are among the most skilled and careful on the road, even the most careful drivers can find themselves facing a charge of careless driving or similar offence. Therefore a knowledge of the law surrounding this subject, particularly the defences which can be put forward, is of vital importance to drivers and fleet owners.
Section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1960 contains the more serious offence of dangerous driving. It makes it an offence to drive a motor vehicle on a road recklessly or at a speed or in a manner dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the road and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be on the road.
If the driver is tried by a magistrates' court, as is usually the case, the maximum penalty for a first offence is four months' imprisonment and/or £100 fine. For a second or subsequent offence the maximum term of imprisonment is six months. This is an offence which can be tried at Quarter Sessions if either the defence or prosecution elect for this and here a driver found guilty can receive two years' imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. Incidentally if a person is killed as the result of the dangerous driving the offence is against Section 1 of the same Act and is only triable at Assizes where the maximum penalty is five years' imprisonment.
In Section 2 there are three separate offences: (a) driving recklessly, (b) driving at a speed dangerous to the public and (c) driving in a manner dangerous to the public. The reckless driving charge is rarely preferred because of the difficulty of proof, for reckless driving goes further than dangerous driving in that the prosecution must prove that the defendant drove with a deliberate and complete abandon for his own safety and the safety of others. As the penalty for all three offences is the same, it is natural that the police will choose the one which is the easiest to prove to the satisfaction of the magistrates or jury.
Turning to the offence of driving at a speed dangerous to the public it was decided in Kingman v Seager (1935) 1 K B 397 that it
was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that any person had been actually put in danger, potential danger being sufficient. In this case a 15-ton lorry was driven at 30-40 mph on a stretch of road with a 20 mph speed limit, a crossroad, a converging road and a bend. It was held that the danger to which the section refers is to be found in the speed itself and where that speed is dangerous no other circumstances need be taken into consideration.
A similar decision was made in Durnell v Scott (1939) 1 All E.R. 183 where a 50cwt furniture van was driven on a Sunday at speeds between 35 and 50 mph along a main trunk road, having five converging roads, a crossroads and 10 bends. However, the prosecution must prove that the speed was dangerous for in a more recent cue, Tribe v Jones (1961) Crim. L.R. 835, a defendant who had driven at 45-65 mph on a wide, well-suifaced but restricted road which was bounded mainly by common land, there being a clear view of side turnings, was found not guilty of this offence.
Now to consider the charge of driving in a manner dangerous. This offence cannot be specifically defined as whether or not a particular piece of driving is dangerous will depend entirely on the circumstances at the time. For example a person driving through empty city streets at dead of night at 40 mph may not be driving dangerously while if he drove in the same manner during the Lunch-time rush hour he certainly would be; 60 mph on a motorway in fog and the same speed on a fine day presents two entirely different conditions one of which is dangerous and the other not. All the circumstances of the case must be taken into consideration, the time of day, the weather, visibility, type of road, the amount of traffic on the road and the type of vehicle are all relevant.
What is the position if the danger alleged was not caused by the driver but by some mechanical defect, say a front tyre bursting and causing the vehicle to swerve, without warning, into the path of an approaching car? R v Spurge (1961) '2 E.R. 486 is an interesting case on this point. The defendant was alleged to have driven round a dangerous bend too fast. He pleaded that the application or the brakes pulled the vehicle over to the wrong side of the road but he had known for some time of this tendency. The court emphasized that cases in which a mechanical defect can successfully be relied upon as a defence in this type of case are rare indeed. The defence has no application where the defect is known to the driver or should have been discovered by him had he exercised reasonable prudence, for to drive a motor car in such circumstances is manifestly dangerous.
The essence of this defence is that danger has been created by a sudden loss of control
in no way due to any fault on the part of the driver. In Hougham v Martin (1964) 108 S.J. 138 the defendant's vehicle left its correct side and travelled gradually over to the offside, where it collided with another vehicle. It was contended on behalf of the defence that the accident might have been caused by a mechanical defect, to which modern mass-produced motor vehicles were prone, but it was not possible to specify. It was held that this did not give rise to a reasonable doubt but was merely fanciful. It was unlikely that the steering failed as the movement across the road was a slow one.
It is clear from these two cases that for the defence of a mechanical fault to succeed the defect must be one of which the driver was unaware and which was no fault of his own and that it manifests itself suddenly, without warning, causing him to lose control.
It is no use putting the defence forward lightly and without good reason. If there is any possibility of a defence of this nature police experts will examine the vehicle and send suspect parts to the Home Office Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. As a result of this examination the scientist will be able to say for example, whether a tyre deflated before the accident or on impact or whether a fracture to a steering arm was caused by metal fatigue or as a result of the accident.
Another defence sometimes put forward is that of "automatism", i.e. a sudden personal affliction such as a "blackout". If a person knows he suffers from blackouts he cannot put this forward as a defence (R v Sibbles (1959) Crim L.R. 397). In this case, the accused, who had high blood pressure and some years before suffered from dizzy spells, drank about five pints of beer and said he had suffered a "blackout". He was Convicted of causing death by dangerous driving and it was said that the defence of "automatism" will only avail if the deprivation of all thought which is caused by the affliction was not connected with any deliberate act or conduct of the accused and arose from a cause which a reasonable man would have no reason to think might occur.
Another case on this subject is Oakes v Foster (1961) Crim L.R. 628. Here the defendant was driving a motorcycle at a fairly fast speed, mounted the nearside kerb, travelled in a 121ft curve along the pavement and then 101ft diagonally across the road, colliding with an oncoming car. He said that he had no recollection of the accident but in the past he had suffered from dizzy spells. His solicitor suggested several occurrences that might have caused the accident and the magistrates dismissed the charge because they were not certain whether something--e.g. the driver having a dizzy spell or being struck by a stone or a bird— had caused him to lose control of his machine.
On appeal the Court said there had been no evidence to this effect and that the objective test in assessing careless driving must be applied and a conviction was directed. (This case referred to careless driving but the same arguments would hold good in a dangerous driving charge.)
It would seem from all this that if a driver was suddenly rendered unconscious through no fault of his own, say by being struck by a stone or attacked by a swarm of bees, or by some illness of which he was unaware, and while unconscious he drove dangerously, he would not be convicted of this offence. If, on the other hand. he was in some way blameworthy—for example driving while knowing that he suffered from epilepsy— this defence would not be open to him. Lord Chief Justice Goddard held in Hill v Baxter (1958) 1 All E.R. 193 that the onus is on the driver to prove that he was in a state of automatism so if a driver wants to put forward this defence he must call the necessary evidence to establish it.
To bring forward a defence of a "blackout" to a charge of dangerous driving is a very serious step to take as under Section 4 of the Road Traffic Act 1962 a Court hearing any case concerning an offence committed with a motor vehicle must inform the licensing authority if it appears to them that the accused is suffering from any disease or physical disability which would make his driving of a vehicle a source of danger to the public. The licensing authority can revoke the driving licence if they are satisfied that such is the case so although the case of dangerous driving may be dismissed on the grounds of automatism there is a strong possibility that the defendant would lose his driving licence.
What is the position if a driver falls asleep while driving and is then charged with dangerous driving? In Kay v Butterworth (1945) 110 JP 75 a night-shift worker fell asleep in broad daylight and drove into the rear of a party of soldiers injuring 16 of them. On appeal it was held that if a driver allows himself to drive when he is asleep he is at least guilty of careless driving because it is his business to keep awake. This particular driver was convicted of dangerous driving.
Section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1960 creates two lesser offences than dangerous driving—driving without due care and attention and driving without due consideration for other road users. These offences are only triable at a magistrates' court and carry a penalty of £100 and'in the case of a second or subsequent conviction to three months' imprisonment and/or the same fine.
Much of t he case law concerning dangerous driving already discussed is equally applicable to careless driving. The following cases of careless driving illustrate points of interest arising from charges of this nature.
Sorrie v Robertson. 1944 SC(J)95.
The defendant in this case was driving his motor lorry at a moderate speed along the main street of a small town, some 50 yards behind was a motorcyclist travelling in the same direction. Wishing to enter a garage, on his offside, he, some 50 yards from the point he would turn right, extended his right arm as a signal to the motorcyclist, whom he could see in his mirror. The cyclist failed to see his signal and maintained his speed.
The defendant withdrew his arm and concentrated on making the turn, but by then the motorcyclist was overtaking and the vehicles collided. The defendant was convicted in the magistrates' court and appealed unsuccessfully against his conviction, the court holding that he had a duty to make sure his signal had been seen by the rider of the vehicle following.
Pratt v Bloom. (1958) Crim L.R. 817.
In this case the fare in a taxi-cab told the driver to turn left and when the driver put out his right arm the fare said, "No not right— left". A driver behind saw the first signal and commenced to overtake on the near side. The taxi driver, without checking on rearward traffic, drove into his path. The taxi-driver was found guilty of careless driving.
McCrone v Riding. (1938)1 Alt E. R. 157.
In allowing an appeal against the decision of the magistrates who had found a learnerdriver "was exercising all the skill and attention to be expected from a person with his short experience" though "he failed to display such skill as would be expected from an ordinary driver under the circumstances", the Lord Chief Justice said: "That standard of care and attention required of a driver is an objective standard, impersonal and universal, fixed in relation to the safety of other users of the highway. It is in no way related to the degree of proficiency or degree of experience attained by the individual driver."
Simpson v Peat. (1952)1All ER. 447.
It was said in this case that a driver may not be using due care and attention although his lack of it may be due to something which could be described as an error of judgment. If he is driving without due care and attention it is immaterial what caused him to do so. The question for the justices is: Was the defendant exercising that degree of care and attention that a reasonable and prudent driver should exercise in the circumstances? If he was not, they should convict.
Cases of driving without reasonable consideration for other road users arise in a number of ways. In Fawley v Whardall (1965) 2 All E.R. 757 where the defendant was charged with this offence it was held that "other road users" included passengers on a bus which was being driven in a manner which alarmed them. If a driver deliberately drove through a puddle of water splashing pedestrians he could well be found guilty of this offence.
The second part of Section 3, the careless driving section, allows magistrates to reduce a charge of dangerous driving to one of careless driving if they are of the opinion that the more serious charge is not proved. When this is done the new charge must be put to the defendant and he must be given an opportunity to re-examine witnesses and if necessary the hearing be adjourned.
A person found guilty of dangerous or careless driving may be disqualified from driving and his licence must be endorsed unless there are special reasons for not doing so. It is hoped to deal more fully with this aspect in a future article and also with the notice of intended prosecution which a driver must be given for these and other offences.