The Minister's Grey Coach Rulings Contested
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The Case of Grey Coaches, Ltd., versus the Minister of Transport. King's Bench Divisional Court Reserves Judgment
HE Lord Chief Justice and Justices Talbot and Charles, sitting as a King's Bench Divisional Court, on. Wednesday of last week, heard arguments on a rule nisi for a mandamus calling on the Minister of Transport to hear and determine appeals by Grey Coaches, Ltd., St. George's Circus, London, S.E., against decisions given in March last by the Metropolitan Traffic Commissioner.
The case came before the Court on Febrintr7 14 and, as reported in our issue dated February 17, was adjourned owing to the sudden illness of Mr. Justice Avery. The Attorney-General (Sir T. Inskip, K.C.) and Mr. Bowstead appeared for the Minister of Transport, and Mr. A. S. Comyns Carr, K.C., Mr. H. J. Astell Burt and Mr. It. P. Winfrey for Grey Coaches, Ltd.
Sir Thomas Inskip said he was appearing to show cause why the rule granted, on September 22 last, by Mr. Justice Lawrence, should not be made absolute. The rule was for a mandamus directing the Minister of Transport to hear appeals, made under the Road Traffic Act, by Grey Coaches, Ltd., against decisions given in March, 1932, by the Metropolitan Traffic Commissioner, who declined to allow the company to have as picking-up points St. George's Place and Northumberland Avenue, and to use Vauxhall Bridge Road as a terminal point for a feeder service.
The company had, for years, carried on a service between London and a number of seaside resorts, ranging from Yarmouth in one direction to Brighton in the south.
The grounds upon which the rule was applied for were that the Minister had fettered his discretion by adopting a report of the Amulree Committee. They also said the Minister had laid down rules for himself, which, in some way, pre-judged the questions that he had to determine ; he was also said to have decided some points of law without hearing arguments upon them.
Traffic Congestion in London.
The Attorney-General explained the provisions of the London Traffic Act, 1924, under which the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee was set up and the matters that might be referred to it.
It was notorious that the traffic congestion in the London area had had the attention of Parliament and the public for many years, especially that in the central area. With a view to relieving that congestion, the London Traffic Act conferred on the Minister power to declare certain streets to he " restricted " with respect to plying for hire.
The London Traffic Act was followed six years later by the Road Traffic Act, under which the appeal arose.
The Minister had a difficult duty to perform and he had to view the problem as a whole. He had to consult the police to give them an opportunity for raising objections and, before issuing general directions on which the Commissioners would act, be must refer the question to the Traffic Advisory Committee, Grey Coaches, Ltd., claimed that the Commissioner had been improperly governed or influenced by instructions given by the Minister, who had no power to issue them, or that he had failed to use his discretion, The company also said that it had not been dealt with on an equitable basis, in view of the Commissioner's decisions in other cases.
In correspondence, the Minister informed the company that he agreed in principle with the conclusions of Lord Amulree's Committee and that he was not prepared to reverse the Commissioner's decisions, unless there were special circumstances which made certain picking-up points necessary in the public interest.
It was said that the Minister had fettered his discretion by adopting, in principle, the conclusions of the Amulree Committee and that he had decided points of law which were ill-founded. The suggestion was that he must deter 824 mine each appeal as if it was a judicial inquiry as' between two parties, the Minister and the applicant; that each case must be considered apart froin any other, and that he was not entitled to approach the consideration of each case with any reference to the principles which he had laid down as the result of experience.
It was said that he must approach each case free from any prejudice as to the desirability or suitability of a particular set of streets. The Minister, added the AttorneyGeneral, was not in the position of a Judge with only two parties before him. He had a wide discretion and was acting in an administrative capacity. He had to consider
what was fair between the applicant and other applicants, as well as the interests of the public.
From one point of view he was the guardian of the public interest. If he declined to let buses set down passengers within 200 yds. of the entrance to Victoria Station he was not pre-judging or fettering his discretion, but was simply' applying the principles which, in his opinion, must be applied in all cases, having regard to the congested nature of the streets in that district. The rule ought to be discharged.
Mr. Comyns Carr, for the respondent, contended that the Minister had failed in his duty, because he bad determined in advance a large part of the matters which Parliament said were to be determined on the appeal. He had determined them in advance by applying the general directions he had given ; secondly, by the adoption of the principles of the Amulree Committee, which were the very principles that the applicants came before him to argue, and, thirdly, by the procedure adopted, namely, by the Amulree Committee receiving in secret a report from the Commissioner of Police, which was wholly unfavourable to the applicants' views and which was published after the decision of the Amulree Committee had been reached.
Secret Report to the Amulree Committee.
The applicants who were not before that Committee had no opportunity for dealing with that report. Not only was that secret report received from the Commissioner of Police, but evidence was taken at a private sitting. He had also adopted the report of a Committee, every sentence of which the applicants desired to contravert in principle and in detail, and which was founded in one part on a complete misapprehension of the law.
In reply to Mr. Justice Charles, Mr. Carr said that if a Minister held an inquiry into an individual appeal, he was bound to submit to the parties any statement he received and on which he proposed to rely. Continuing, he said that conditions were attached to coach licences as to picking-up places, etc., and this was justified by saying, "You are not the only contributor to the congestion—the private car is much worse—but we can tackle you and not the private car or goods vehicle."
The Lord Chief Justice: "Is it not fair to remember that this committee was appointed with reference to coaches? " Mr. Carr: "Yes, but the argument before it was that it ought not to say that, on account of traffic congestion, motor coaches should not be allowed in the central area when they are not the worst offenders in the matter. To deal with that, the committee should restrict everyone or restrict the worst offenders," When the hearing was resumed on Thursday, Mr. Comyns Carr submitted that the inspector appointed by the Minister to hear and report on the applicant company's appeal to the Minister had refused to bear the matter with an open. mind, unfettered by the principles which the Minister had laid down for his own guidance. The Minister was bound to maintain an open mind and to permit an appellant to argue that the principles of fact which he had laid down were wrong.
The Court reserved judgment