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THE CIPPENHAM DEPOT AND THE INDUSTRY.

27th April 1920, Page 14
27th April 1920
Page 14
Page 14, 27th April 1920 — THE CIPPENHAM DEPOT AND THE INDUSTRY.
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Which of the following most accurately describes the problem?

THE FOLLOWING communication has been made to the Press by Mr. IL C. B. Underdewn, President, of the Association of British Motor Manufacturers, Ltd.

In a recent'y published interview, Lord Inverforth, Minister of Munitions and Supplies, refers to the motor tramport repair depot at Cippenham, and complains that he has been bitterly attacked by the motor industry for having established the depot, full responsibility for which he accepts. • The Association of British Motor Manufacturers opposed t•he Cippenham project from the time when it was first mooted in 1916 a,s a war measure, because, in the opinion of the Association, the project was not calculated to secure the necessary repairs of mechaniCal transportvehicles at home and abroad in the quickestii:pasible tune, -having regard to the great urgency then existing to increase and maintain the supply of mechanical transport vehicles. Lord Inverforth states that no one in the motor industry was willing, seemingly, at that time to establish such a depot, and imputes shortsightedness to Ole industry in not foreseeing the future widespread demand for motor transport of all kinds, which would have justified the industry in taking the risk of establishing a depot of this kind.

No steps were taken by the Government' towards putting the project into force until late in 1917; owing to the difficolties of shortage of labour and priority of materials. During the whole of that period, and right up to the date of the Armistice, the motor manufactuilng industry's efforts were confined to the production of the-maximum possible amount of vehicles and other munitions of war.

In March, 1918, the Association of British Motor Manufacturers communicated to the.Ministry of Munitions their willingness to put forward a scheme on behalf of manufacturers for the repair on extensive lines of motor transport vehicles. The suggestion wa.slinot encouraged, and in July, 1918, a definite offer on behalf -of 11 important firms was made, under which repairs at the rate of 250 vehicles per, week (at a profit to be agreed upon between,the Government and the manufacturers) would be carried out, provided:that the Government, supplied the spare palls., of which, they already held a very • large stock, and provided also that similar arrangements, as regards priority of materials and supply of labour and additions to factory premises, to those made as regards output. of vehicles were given effect to by the Government, and prNided also so that a sum, not exceeding £250,000, as a repayable contribution, was made by the Government towards the cost of the necessary extensions. This sum represented only a small Part of hie capital expenditure which manufacturers were prepared to undertake for this purpose. The offer was a-carefully considered one, but was never seriously entertained

C30 by the Government, still less accepted. How, then, can Lord Inverforth suggest that the motor industry made no attempt to assist in this matter at that time?

AsVegards thortsightediTess with which he accuses the motor 'industry, he appears to forget that all through the. period _under review, motor manufacturers' factories were being continually extended for productive purposes, and in _ many cases had trebled in size long .,before the date of the Armistice, Manufacturers foresaw, certainly as _quickly as anyone else, the tremendous impetus to mechanical transport which the war would undoubtedly afford, but they at the same time foresaw, so far as commercial vehicles were con cerned, that the disposal of. many thousands of vehicles after the war, added to large imports from America, and their own enormously increased facilities for production, held out dangers in the future as regards the powers of markets to absorb so large a supply.

At the rroment of writing there are still many thousands of lorries of W.D. type awaiting disposal.

Lord Inverforth states that the industry has recanted because he has succeeded in disposing of the depot at a

profit.. No details are,'as yet available as to the basis upon

which this profit is reckoned, but I may point out that no suggestion has ever yet reached the Association nor the British

motor manufacturers composing its membership (which includes all the leading firms in the trade) that they should consider making an offer for the depot. Where, then, is the recantation?

As a year measure, the Cippenham depot utterly failed to justify itself, and it was as a war measure that the motor industry opposed it. It never had the -smallest effect on the repairs or supply_ of vehicles during the war, although the idea was first mooted in 1916 and the Armistice was not signed until November, 1918. Lord Inverforth attempts .-to justify the depot on the grounds of the enormous demand for motor transport after the

war, well knowing that the position daring the war as regards shortage of labour, buildings, and material made any post:war scheme utterly unjustifiable.

There are many other reasons why the British motor manufacturing industry opposed the Cippenham depot, both as a war measure and as a pest-war measure, to which lack of space forbids me to refer.

Lord Inverforth is entitled to congratulate himself on having got rid of the depot. Whether the British motor manufacturing industry can do so is another matter, but in any ewe the sale of the depot does not affect the considerations to which I have drawn attention. H. C. B. UNDEBDOWN, President.


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