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Action on the Report

21st April 1944, Page 35
21st April 1944
Page 35
Page 35, 21st April 1944 — Action on the Report
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Which of the following most accurately describes the problem?

Road Transport Presented with an Excellent Opportunity of Stating a Strong Case for Justice and for Such By Freedom as Will Benefit the War Effort and the Post"Tantalus" war Status of Haulage SO momentous a document is the Report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure, " Rail and Road Transport," that it should stimulate the thoughts of every individual engaged in road haulage. No one reading the report can possibly resist the impelling force of the findings of the committee, nor can he fail to be moved by this record of failure and wastage.

The scheme has proved to be a costly national experiment. It is an expensive form of administration, lavish in the use of man-power and uneconomic in the large percentage of dead mileage ensuing as a result of the empty running of vehicles. If it had been efficiently and economically operated, on lines ensuring the serving of the national interests in the best possible way, then the question of cost might rank as a secondary matter. What is particularly regrettable is the fact that failure and inefficiency go hand in hand with heavy overhead charges. So the matter becomes national in character and assumes a serious aspect. The whole question deeply concerns " John Citizen," the taxpayer, who has to foot the bill.

It may be recalled that the Select Committee was appointed for the purpose of examining current expenditure which is defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament for services connected directly with the war effort. The committee is, in fact, the watchdog over the spending of public moneys and, as such, acts as a safeguard in protection of the interests of the taxpayer.

This is one of the major reasons why the report is important to the general public and of deep significance to members of the road-haulage industry. The latter, as individuals, have to bear their burdens in the same degree as other members of the community. Therefore they are concerned in national affairs equally as taxpayers and hauliers.

Set Policy Conceived to Ensure Subjection of Road Haulage There can be few industries in which the operators con, cerned have been so severely penalized as those who earn

their living by road haulage. It is astounding. that so essential a national service should have been so abjectly subdued as the result of a deliberate policy. Particularly is this so, having regard to the fact that, in order to meet war-production needs, the industry should not merely have been developed to the fullest capacity, but, wherever and whenever necessary, it should have been expanded to meet the increased demands of the war effort,

Notwithstanding the various explanations which have been forthcoming from time to time, in support of the Control Scheme, these are brushed aside in the report, which states (a) that the main principle was to make road haulage subsidiary to all other'forms of transport, and (b) that no traffic was to be conveyed by road which should he carried by some other form of transport.

These are blunt and unqualified Words which admit of no argument. Moreover, they expose fully the real, but hitherto unacknowledged, reason for the repressive measure of control.

Whethey or not such a policy was in the national interest was, apparently, Considered a matter of minor importance. As for the effect upon the war effort this, too, appeared to be a secondary consideration. It is remarkable that as the tempo of the war demands increased so were the restrictions upon road transport multiplied. This at a time when it was patent to all that such a policy, surely, was a'mistaken one and ccilifcl not, from any point of view.; be regarded as serving the national needs.

It is not so much a question of satisfying this or that section of the industry or whether the complaints are exaggerated or otherwise, although these points are not unimportant. The root of the matter, however, goes much deeper than that, for it is entirely fundamental in character. It is nothing more or less than a question as to whether the scheme has resulted in the national transport system being organized and -implemented in such a manner as to produce the best results in serving the war-production machine and the war effort generally.

With regard to the railways, there is no desire to withhold recognition of the fact that they are hearing a heavy burden with considerable credit. At the same time it must be conceded that road transport has not been permitted to play it full part in carrying a full and rightful measure of responsibility in respect of the war effort. There are on record numerous examples where production has been impeded and retarded as a result of the roadtransport restrictions. The following two instances, which are of recent date, will serve to illustrate the point. le one case a factory had to close down for two days because material which should have been delivered by road was despatched by rail. Inquiries revealed that road transport was available, but use of the service was denied. The other case is one in which material had. been given priority for road transport, but wa$ despatched by rail. Here again, vehicles were available but were not employed. That was some 15 days ago as I write and, so far, delivery of the material is still awaited.

Effects of Repressive Transport Measures are Manifold In both the foregoing examples not only must the adverse effect upon production be considered but, in addition, the workers are directly affected. They have been dompelled to go on short time pending delivery of the material and, as they are paid on piece-work rates, the enforced reduction in output is seriously reflected in their Wage packets. Consequently, it will be realized that the effect of these repressive measures extends far beyond the interests and confines of the hauliers.

The railways cannot be blamed for long delays in the matter of deliveries following upon congestion due to the abnormal weight df traffics and the labour position. In fact it has been admitted that the railways, in many directioes, are overloaded. Yet, notwithstanding this state of affairs, the use of available road transport is still denied, even in apparently approved instances. By no stretch of the imagination can it be averred that this system has proved an asset to the war effort. Any form of control which does not permit the full use of productive capacity for essential purposes, or which hampers the effort and output of the individual, must be judged as prejudicial to the war effort and, therefore, not in the national interest.

The clear and decisive note sounded by the report has resulted in the call being answered in the right quarter. With his unwavering loyalty to the road-haulage industry Capt. Strickland, along with other interested M.P.s, has pressed for a debate on the report in the House of Commons. In the event of this maturing, which may be before this article appears, it is hoped that a convincing and unshakable brief will be provided by the representatives of the industry.

Provided the case be preriared with Meticulous care and judgment, the prospects of convincing the House of the justice of the claims of the road-transport industry are encouraging.This is an opportunity which should be seized with avidity and, in the national interest, turned to the best possible account.


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