The Value of Motor Vehicles in War.*
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No one will deny the importance of the change in the daily life of every class in the community, which the inin-Auction of motor vehicles has brought about. It touches every individual, for the application of motor machinery to public conveyances, such as omnibuses, and to the commercial vans which are used for the distribution of daily necessities throughout our great cities, has placed the innovation at the service of the whole population. The changes and the facilities gained by the class which can afford to possess driving cars is, of course, we'll known to this audience. So little does the public mind focus on military questions, that, perhaps, it is not astonishing that this mighty improvement in all sorts of transportation, from the racing car which can carry one or two individuals to a 10-ton lorry, has excited but little attention as an instrument of war, in spite of the increased attention which preparation for war has received in recent. years.
The Arbitrament of War.
" War is wicked, because it causes suffering, and be-muse those who suffer don't like it," that is doubtless true, but in an imperfect world it looks as if war had come to stay in some shape, although doubtless its particular shape and the scale on which it will he waged will continue to change from decade to decade in the future as in the past. In particular, wars are likely to become less frequent in the twentieth century, but are likely to be waged on a more colossal scale than ever before. The stake at issue is likely to be more important; the fate of South Africa and Manchuria, vast regions with great resources of expanding wealth and population, have already been settled by war, though the century has not completed its first decade. The next decade may net impossibly see an armed contest in Western Europe, which may have effects at least as decisive and far reaching in regulating the mastership of the fairest part of the earth. If such a struggle takes place, the flames of war will COMO very near home. I believe, then, that you will readily admit how great an interest we all have in seeing that the instruments for waging war in our possession are reliable and up to date, and I also believe I can show you that the particular instrument which we are discussing to-night may play an important part, and that the members of this Club have it in their power to assist in the preparation which is essential for raising any new resource in war. I will not. be technical, and, in fact, the matter is essentially one of common sense within the reach of all.
Where Motors Come In.
The device which most naturally suggests itself in the war use of motorcars is the rapid transporting of troops to a threatened point. For that purpose the numerous private cars and the motorbtises of London would enable the commander of an army defending England against invasion to despatch considerable forces by road, in Case railways were not available, or to supplement the railways. Cars and buses could be collected at stations near the threatened point, and used to move detachments of infantry of from 500 to 1,000 men very rapidly, to guard a bridge, railway station, or landing place, until the main body of our troops could arrive. Motorcycles have so many virtues of their own that I did not mean to include them in a talk about motor vehicles, but I should say that for this particular purpose, the rapid conveyance of small detachments, they will be invaluable, and, of course, for despatch riding. Few men realise how critical may be the work of a small party in hanging on to some important locality. Familiar examples, however, can be quoted in every war from Thermopyhe to Paardeburg drift, and the difficulty of sizing up a force which lies on the defensive and fights with smokeless ammunition and magazine rifles greatly favours such enterprises. Had the Boers known
the exact. strength and condition of the cavalry brigade which cut them off from the road to Bloemfontein at the Madder drift, they would certainly have swept it aside. Armies will always move slowly; the main force takes a long while to convert itself from a long column of wayfarers on the road into a line of battle ready for action. That process is known as deployment, i.e., unfolding. Much might be done while it is in progress, and the rapid movement of cavalry (and, nowadays, detachments mounted on cycles or motors) will certainly offer great opportunities. Simple as this method of using motors seems, yet it requires forethought and calculation to make it effective, for wild confusion can easily ensue in a great column of these vehicles unless the column is properly controlled, and more formidable still will be the difficulty of collecting at the right time and place, in the first instance, to meet a sudden attack, unless the whole concentration is carefully worked out beforehand.
Supply and Communications.
A yet more important use for motor vehicles in war lies in the department of supply. Roads, waterways, and railroads connect an army with its home, and along them its reserves -of troops to replace losses, its food, ammunition, hospital comforts and forage go to the front, while an equally important stream of wounded prisoners, empty vans on their way to be replenished, go in the opposite direction. Like arterial and venous circulation, the two currents must be able to make their way unimpeded, or the army suffers, perhaps fatally. The object of almost all strategy is not only to defeat the enemy's forces, to weaken them by injuring, dispersing and frightening their personnel, but also to drive the hostile forces off its lines of communication. Another scheme 'sometimes tried is to cut these lines at some distance in rear of the hostile army, so as, at any rate, to cause grave confusion and inconvenience. The civil war in America gives abundant instances. Lord Roberts's failure to protect his great convoy of wagons during the pursuit of Cronje to Paardeburg went very near to causing a disaster. Any invention, therefore, which materially affects the lines of communication of an army, must be of the greatest military importance. A moment's reflection will show any intelligent person how greatly motor vehicles have changed the work of the lines of conununication by facilitating it, and how much they have increased the already great difficulty of cutting those lines by their relative speed, handiness and capacity for concealment. Even along roads within the range of hostile enterprise, cars can be run thus, under cover of darkness, where formerly such an attempt was hopeless. If the country can be traversed off the roads, as the African veldt in winter, the advantage of the motor vehicle over its enemy is, of course, ten-fold greater. In the South-African War, when a convoy was attacked it generally suffered severe loss, even if it escaped capture; if ox-drawn wagons were attacked by
riflemen before the oxen were inspanned, it does not take a very vivid imagination to realize how quickly the whole convoy became a total wreck ; nor is there any difficulty in seeing how much less vulnerable motor vehicles are on all such occasions.
Independence of Railways.
If war takes place in civilized regions, the whole ma chinery of commerce is, at any rate, locally paralyzed, and several hundred thousand men on either side march forth to fight. Forces on this gigantic scale require to be supplied by machinery correspondingly effective. It has been said that war on the modern system and scale
could not be waged without railways, and that the failure of Napoleon in his Russian invasion was caused principally from his trying to handle such masses without railways to supply them. If this theory is correct, then it may also be said that the armies of to-day cannot be manoetvred off the railways without resorting to motor vehicles. I need not emphasize how great then would be the advantage of having such transport properly organized and ready for use. Its availability may make the difference between being able to manoeuvre, and being chained to a zone not exceeding a day's march from a railway station. The Paardeburg campaign again presents itself as an illustration. The Boer army was cut off and captured by Lord Kitchener, because the Boer leader, having had experience of a number of generals, did not believe that the British would venture to leave the railway. Unluckily for him, his opponent in this case was Kitchener. The forces an this occasion were small, SG that the marneuvre was possible though hazardous, and in point of fact the capture of Lord Roberts's convoy
in the rear of the British army placed it in a very awk ward predicament, from which it only emerged victoriously by the energetic leadership and brilliant fighting on the battlefield of Paardeburg. The possession of motor cars by both or either side would have produced a very different situation. The attempt of the Confederate army to retreat from Richmond, the retreats from Metz and Sedan in 1870, would all have been feasible operations by the favour of motor vehicles, instead of disasters.
Staff Efficiency.
The appearance of great leaders will probably be even leas frequent in the future than in the past, because wars are less frequent and peace-time fails to give evidence of the qualities required in war ; but, when such an one does obtain command of an army, then he will make a mighty use of his motorcar, if by that time he does not ordinarily travel in the air. It has been said that the command of any army by one great chief must be a thing of the past, owing to the distances which separate different fractions of the same army in a derisive collision. Kuropatkin entirely failed to follow the events, or to keep touch with his enemy's manceuvre.s, in the great struggles of Liao Yang and Mukden. A motor vastly simplifies the problem. A line of battle extending even 100 miles can be traversed in a. few hours by the commanding general, if he wishes to show himself to his troops, or to see things with his own eyes. The difference in the Napoleonic wars, between the performances of the French troops when the Emperor was present and when he was not, proves the influence which this means of rapid transit may exert. Even when the great chief does not exist, and when his place is taken by a carefully-trained staff, which was something like the system of the Germans in 1870, yet the motorcar will not be less useful in linking up separated divisions of the army, and facilitating concerted action. No man who has not studied war comprehends how difficult concerted action becomes on any battlefield, big or little. Any invention, therefore, which tends to facilitate it is of incalculable importance.
Lastly, there remains the education and refreshment of soul and body which the motorcar confers on its user. The gain to health, energy, and judgment in its use will be a. valuable asset in war. The virility which invented and perfected them, and the determination not to be bested by the foreigner in the motor trade, in spite of his fiscal advantages, are qualities which count for much in preparing for and waging war. But prepare we must, or we shall not improbably be defeated when the great day comes, which, we hear, is daily toasted aboard the fleet of a certain friendly Power!
The Discussion.
Mr. E. Shrapnell Smith, who was the only speaker to touch upon commercial vehicles, stated that, unfortunately, the War Office bad dealt with the registration of commercial vehicles in a most disappointing fashion. There was at this moment a change of Secretary to the Mechanical Transport Committee of that Department; Captain Bagnall-Wild had recently resigned in order to take up an important position in the commercial-motor world, and his successor in the Department had not been appointed. He thought that they would regret the absence of any representative of the Mechanical Transport Committee. It was an accident, and if Captain Bagnall Wild had still been there he was sure he would have represented his Department that evening. At the same time, he (the speaker) was going to impeach the War Office for its treatment of the trade as compared with the German policy. The German policy, he knew, was to subsidize industry; a contrary policy prevailed in England. As Germany was mentioned several times by Captain Battane, he might be excused for referring to that country. Two or three years ago the German War Department, acting on reports that the British War Office was moving in the
matter, decided upon a thorough subsidization and registration scheme for commercial vehicles. He had checked
the figures of the German system, and had found that every buyer of a commercial vehicle who was put on the register had a constructional bonus of £200—a considerable fraction of the first cost—and there subsequently was an annual subsidy of £50 per registered vehicle. Now,
the British War Office had been extremely dilatory. It had been his privilege, with Mr, Arthur Stanley, in 1902, to put the first registration scheme before the War Office,
and, representing owners in those days; they had suggested that it would not be extravagant to give £20 a year for a five-ton vehicle. The War Office had scouted the idea
altogether. They had put the report in a pigeon-hole, where it had remained undusted for four years, and then they came out in January, 1907, with a scheme providing For the magnificent annual subsidy of £2 per vehicle. That compared with Germany's £200 constructional bonus and £50 a year. The relative position arts that, whereas the
British War Department was paying not more than £1,200 a year, the German War Office in 1908 subsidized
138 vehicles at a cost of £27,600 for constructional value, and in the year 1909 it had added 180 vehicles at a cost of £36,000, whilst in annual sums of £50 to owners it was now committed to pay £16,000 a year. It was proposed to go on with that scheme in 1910. Taking, moreover, the percentage of roads in Germany as compared with that of England, the comparison made the home position still more unfavourable, and he thought that those figures, for which he could vouch, should not be passed over with out serious reflection. As one who had worked hard, in association with many owners of commercial vehicles, to try to obtain something from the British War Office, he had found that the most they could get was the notifica tion—" If we go to war, we will commandeer the lot of you!" The patriotism of owners of vehicles would, no doubt, make them let the vehicles go without com mandeering, but the attitude did not seem fair, and the terms did not seem liberal. A scheme had just been placed before the War Office to increase the subsidy from
C2 to £10. The War Department used to pay 10s. a head for the registration of omnibus horses, a sum later re duced to 5s., and a. motor wagon or tractor was often
equivalent to 30 horses, so that it did not seem to be an equitable arrangement that the subsidy should be so low as at present. Captain Bettina had made a reference to the fact that it was necessary for those in charge of mechanical transport to be thoroughly acquainted with
the work. The first serious test was made in consequence of a suggestion in the discussion on Sir John Macdonald's paper at the United Service Institution in April, 1907, that suggestion having been that a test should be undertaken with motorbuses to see what could be done in the way of conveying troops at short notice for 50 or 60 miles. The test was carried out from Warley Barracks to a point
on the Essex coast, and certainly the experiment was satisfactory. That preceded the test to Hastings. Captain Battine was quite right in his criticism of the Hastings ride, with regard to the length of the column, but the return to London was a most marvellous demonstration of how drivers without supervision could maintain their distance, travelling an average speed well above the legal limit. It showed the conveyance of three troopers per 25 ft., whereas 30 men could be conveyed by motorbus in the same distance.
Captain Battine, replying to the points raised, said that Mr. Shrapnell Smith's speech was of great importance. He regretted the absence that evening of any representative of the War Office.