AT THE HEART OF THE ROAD TRANSPORT INDUSTRY.

Call our Sales Team on 0208 912 2120

Productivity and Incentives

15th February 1963
Page 75
Page 76
Page 75, 15th February 1963 — Productivity and Incentives
Close
Noticed an error?
If you've noticed an error in this article please click here to report it so we can fix it.

Which of the following most accurately describes the problem?

NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY YEAR is an appropriate, period for operators to consider inaugurating, or alter

, natively extending, bonus schemes within their transport organizations. Yet in this particular sphere of industrial activity the very adjective " National " can be misapplied. Incentive schemes are commonly associated with industrial production, and particularly mass-production. Provided there is agreement between management and men, and that the resulting end product remains acceptable to the customer, then no other interests need necessarily be considered when such incentive schemes are being formulated. Just as the factory is normally on private ground, so any such scheme is often a purely private agreement between two parties—management and men; and when such schemes are being inaugurated the validity of teething troubles can be readily established by both parties on the spot and a solution evolved. These conditions are in contrast to those which confront many road transport operators Even transport managers of ancillary fleets engaged on local retail distribution see comparatively little of their drivers, possibly two or three times a day. Long-distance hauliers might see their men once a week. It follows, therefore, that incentive schemes which have proved successful in manufacturing industries are not necessarily adaptable or suitable to transport. Initial complications of a new scheme which were eventually ironed out when all staff remain under one roof, could prove insurmountable with drivers -dispersed to all points of the compass. • More important still, a commercial vehicle driver is in a special position as compared with a factory or similar worker. Whilst being under the common obligation to his employer to carry out his duties efficiently, a driver must also have regard for other road users and for the host of regulations contained in the Road Traffic Act, 1960, and allied Acts and Regulations. Such regard may well have the effect of lowering the driver's efficiency in terms of the amount of work done. Indeed, circumstances can arise when the driver's achievement of productivity is in opposition to national productivity measured by the free flow of other road users engaged in commercial or industrial activities.

ROAD transport, therefore, because it is a service industry making use of public highways, can usefully consider few, if any, of its problems in isolation. Allowance must be made for relatively extraneous factors, and some compromise reluctantly accepted if schemes are to take practical effect. Incentive and bonus schemes are no exception and the relatively short life of many such schemes when applied to transport has often been due to a failure to recognize, or refusal to accept, the special conditions of transport operation.

Yet despite these special conditions and difficulties it can he claimed with justification that there is a great and continuing need for efficiency to be measured, and if possible raised, in transport. This is not because efficiency in the transport industry is low, but because the basic labour cost is inevitably a higher proportion of the total operating cost than in most other industries; relatively small increases in productivity per man will result in substantial total savings. Assuming that an operator is contemplating introducing an incentive scheme for his drivers, it would be natural if he were to examine similar schemes which may be in use in the area. But as there are pitfalls in endeavouring to transpose incentive schemes from other industries to transport, so difficulties can arise if sufficient consideration is not given to the wide variety of duties performed by commercial vehicle drivers.

• Many competent drivers have purposely chosen to do their particular jobs because of the opportunity to exercise initiative and accept responsibility over a variety of duties in contrast with the limited activities of modern factory work. Therefore, however well devised and intended, any incentive scheme which has the effect of making a previously competent driver feel that he is henceforth to be reckoned as a unit rather than an important member of the staff in his own right is doomed to failure.

PROBABLY worse still is the lasting effect of any scheme which implies from the outset that operating staff are suspect. Even if in both cases the scheme were eventually dropped, there would probably remain a residue of discontent where previously a reasonable measure of mutual confidence existed between management and men. Ill-advised schemes, therefore, may well result in less, and not more, productivity.

Before any scheme is introduced careful consideration must be given as to whether the circumstances warrant any additional incentives and, if so, whether those selected are not only appropriate to the particular set of conditions but are likely to remain workable and acceptable to all concerned. Whilst not coming within the category of ill-advised, some incentive schemes have been eventually discarded because they added little to higher productivity at the expense of more clerical work, and possible administrative time adjudicating interminable " borderline " appeals by disgruntled staff.

The variety of duties performed by a commercial vehicle driver includes that of salesman, particularly when engaged on retail distribution. It is among this particular group of drivers that scope does exist, and the opportunity is frequently taken to implement incentive schemes based on total sales made by the driver from his van or mobile shop. With this type of operation, any increase in sales is normally-related to the number of deliveries rather than an increase in quantity at one or two points. Consequently an incentive to increase sales could result in greater usage of the vehicle and, with a spreading of standing costs over a greater mileage and tonnage, higher vehicle productivity.

As stated earlier, however, a commercial vehicle driver is at all times responsible at law for his acts whilst on the public highway. Whatever sales incentive schemes are introduced, the driver's responsibility to other road users must remain his first priority. This should be stated plainly by the employer in any instructions issued in connection with incentive schemes.

Failure on the part of either driver or employer—or both— to recognize this priority can have widespread repercussions detrimental to everyone, not least the road transport industry as a whole. The attraction of public criticism of the industry. with possible restrictions as a result, is too high a price to pay for any incentive scheme, even though it may appear successful in a narrow view over a short term.

To offset the possibility of encouraging doubtful driving methods to facilitate securing high bonuses under any particular incentive scheme related to sales or tonnage, an allied scheme, could be introduced tied to vehicle performance and ultimate operating cost. Under ideal conditions the introduction of an incentive scheme allied to sales or tonnage could have the laudable effect of reducing or eliminating non-productive vehicle time which previously existed In practice, unless prudently applied, it will do nothing of the kind. Non-productive vehicle time will remain much the same and any increased " output " will he achieved largely at the expense of unwarranted speeding. If, however, a bonus is also paid. along with a sales or tonnage incentive, on the rate of fuel consumption achieved, it would then be in the driver's own interest to curb the tendency to by-pass the real objective of a sales incentive scheme by speeding. This is because, under normal traffic conditions, consistently good fuel consumption rates are the result of considerate driving. Concurrently wear and tear on brakes, engine, and transmission in particular and the vehicle generally are less, giving lower running costs.

One of the first difficulties confronting many operators inaugurating an incentive scheme is the absence, or at least apparent absence of suitable data on which to formulate such a scheme. In the manufacturing industries time and motion studies have been undertaken for many years and work has been quantified in considerable detail. As a result a large amount of data is now available, and often published, to which reference can be made, if only for comparative purposes.

Little if any such data relative to transport has been published, if it exists at all, with the notable exception of the laundry industry. Such absence of data, however, is no valid reason for assuming that the work undertaken by the driver of a commercial vehicle cannot be quantified.

Undoubtedly substantial difficulties do exist in endeavouring to quantify such work, due to the many variable factors, some of which are not within even the most experienced operators' control, e.g. unscheduled variations in road and traffic conditions. Additionally it has to be accepted by the very nature of their work that most drivers are outside visual supervision for most of their working day.

Nevertheless, by the same token, it can be rightly contended that this situation is all the more reason why some attempt must be made to formulate an acceptable yardstick by which to measure what can be considered a reasonable day's work. Until that is done any incentive scheme based on work content— whether measured on sales, tonnage or other unit—must be totally unrealistic. Worse still, the absence of any such yardstick will engender slackness generally, particularly if at the same time no disciplinary action is taken when, in specific instances, the amount of work done by a particular driver is unreasonably low.

In such circumstances capable and willing drivers will see their efforts rewarded only at the common level. Moreover, they could be under oblique pressure not to put slower workers in an unfavourable light. Ultimately, if appropriate steps are not taken, the " output " of the entire fleet will become merely a multiple of that of the slowest worker. But until a recognized work standard has been devised, appropriate steps cannot be taken to avoid such a non-productive situation. S.B.

Tags


comments powered by Disqus