How Licences
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May be Lost
Offences for Which Disqualification from Driving is Compulsory or Permissive: "Special Reasons" for Lenience
By Our Legal Adviser
THERE is a good deal of confusion on the subject of disqualification for a driving offence. It is frequently not realized that for certain offences a penalty of disqualification for a period is absolutely pbligatory and will automatically follow a conviction. I have heard a defendant plead guilty to a charge of langerous driving when, with one previous conviction for the same offence, he was liable to automatic iisqualification. The Clerk of the Court persuaded him to change his plea to one of " not guilty." In the event he was found guilty only of careless driving.
The reason for such disbelief among offenders that anything so awful could happen to them is that they are nearly always convinced that in their case, at least, there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to enable the court to take a lenient view. Most of them who know that disqualification in certain cases is automatic also have a vague idea at the back of their minds that the law provides a loophole if the court can find "special reasons " for not imposing the penalty.
Disqualification—apart from those offences for which it may be imposed, such as careless driving or a third conviction for exceeding the speed limit—must be imposed in the normal event in four specific offences. These are the offences created by the Road Traffic Act, 1930, in Section 11—reckless or dangerous driving (but only in respect of a second or subsequent offence); in Section 15—driving or attempting to drive or being in charge of a vehicle while under the influence of drink or a drug; in Section 35—using or causing or permitting the use of a vehicle without third-party insurance; and in Section 13—promoting or taking part in races or speed trials on the public highway.
"Special Reasons"
The saving words of the Act in respect of the disqualification for these offences are " unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise." Despite the appearance from those words that the matter might be entirely within the court's discretion, it has now been clear law for some time that this discretion can be exercised only within narrow limits. Those limits may be expressed by the rule that the reasons for not disqualifying must be special to the facts of the case and not special to the defendant himself.
Thus, all considerations of a personal nature which would normally be mitigating circumstances, such as financial or other hardship, or the defendant's previous good record or the unlikelihood of his ever offending again, all become irrelevant. On the other hand, if a driver charged with dangerous driving was a doctor rushing to a critical case, that would be a mitigating circumstance arising out of the facts of the case itself.
An examination of some of the numerous cases which have been decided on this question of "special reasons' may help to show why certain cases fall on one side of the line and some on the other. Most of the betterknown reported decisions concern the offence of driving while uninsured or driving under the influence of drink.
As regards insurance, it is the obvious duty of a vehicle owner to see that he is properly insured, and an excuse of forgetfulness or carelessness in renewing the policy cannot amount to special reasons. Nor can there be a genuine mistake as to the extent of the cover provided by the policy, for it is the policy-holder's duty to acquaint himself with its terms. On the other hand, if there is any suggestion of a genuine, mistake incurred through someone else's fault, the more lenient view may lawfully be taken.
Thus, when a garage proprietor applied for a fullcover policy but was issued with a named-driver policy without any explanation by the insurance company, it was held that he had been misled and this might constitute a special reason. So also, when a vehicle was advertised for sale as "taxed and insured," and the seller had undertaken to transfer the policy to the buyer but had failed to do so, and the purchaser drove the vehicle uninsured without knowing it, this was held to be a special reason.
Case for Lenience In general, one can say that where the terms of the policy itself are not sufficient to cover the risk in law, but the insurance company are prepared to say that they would have considered themselves "on risk," the courts will take the lenient view.
It is also unreasonable to expect an employee to question his master as to whether he is properly covered when ordered to drive a particular vehicle. Such a situation might well afford special reasons for not disqualifying the employee.
In a specific case in which special reasons were found arising out of the relationship of master and servant, an employer told an unlicensed servant to get a licence— the policy exempting driving by unlicensed drivers—and gave him the money for it. Some days later the employer permitted him to drive without inquiring Whether he had the licence. In fact, he had not.
As regards offences arising from drink, a line is generally drawn between those cases in which a defendant has actually driven or tried to drive a vehicle and where he has merely been in charge of it. The besl contrast here is between the case where a man drove for 10 minutes and then, realizing he was affected by drink, stopped and went to sleep, and the case where a driver got drunk after a breakdown and the lorry could not be moved, so he went to sleep in the cab, not wishing to leave it unattended. In the former example, there were held to he no special reasons, as the driver must have been under the influence when he began his journey, but in the latter case the circumstances were leniently interpreted.
These are but examples of the many cases calling for the possible exercise of the court's discretion as regards disqualification. No case is quite on all fours with another, but the authoritative decisions of the Divisional Court have ensured a measure of uniformity in the application of this discretion in magistrates' courts.
Even within those narrow limits, it does not follow that the discretion will be exercised in the defendant's favour. The rule is that if there are legitimate "special reasons" the court is entitled not to impose disqualification if it chooses. It is well to realize that for the offences with which I have been dealing, a conviction will almost certainly result in disqualification, because courts do not seek excuses to avoid that severe penalty.