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Obstr uction in 1_, aw ?
By Our Legal Adviser
DAY after day in magistrates' courts up and down the country there are heard hundred's of summonses against drivers alleging obstruction, and the monotony of the procedure is relieved only by the academic question whether the fine is going to be 20s. or 30s. In some towns the problem of where to park—even if for only a few minutes—is really acute, and in London successively drastic measures have been tried by the authorities, with the only result of harrying those drivers who have to park for a legitimate reason equally with those selfish persons who leave their vehicles while they do axomplete morning's shopping or pay a social call.
The culmination of this "campaign "—for it can be called little else—is the imposition of an absolute " no-waiting " ban, even for the necessary business reasons of loading or unloading. There are many variations of the same theme from unilateral parking on alternate days, up through the areas where parking is limited to a certain time in any one hour, to the yellow band" streets where no parking is permitted.
Without being, for the moment, controversial on the desirability or otherwise of some of these restrictive measures, it would Seem that a re-statement of the law on the subject of " obstruction " generally would not come amiss, for it Seems likely that the police and many magistrates' courts have tended to lose sight of certain fundamental principles.
Thousands of summonses are issued in respect of alleged obstruction where there • is no question of a complete ban on waiting or even a partial ban, as where waiting for a limited period is permitted. Drivers have been convicted after no more than a 10-minute wait, once the police constable involved has gone in the box and alleged that other traffic has been in some way inconvenienced, and the belief seems to have grown up that any stopping of a vehicle in a street is prima facie an obstruction. Such is not the law and never has been, and it is time publicity was given to that fact.
Rule Still in Force
Prosecutions for obstruction are generally laid under the Construction and Use Regulations, the relevant regulation reading as follows: "No person in charge of a motor vehicle or trailer shall cause or permit the motor vehicle or trailer to stand on a road so as to cause any unnecessary obstruction thereof." However, before these Regulations came into being, the law was most explicitly laid down in 1917 in the case of Gill v. Carson and NieId which arose in respect of a summons for obstruction under Section 28 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1848, which is still in force.
This decision of the Divisional. Court, presided over by the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Reading, has never been overruled, or indeed doubted, and the correct application of the common-sense principles it propounds would result in a high percentage of acquittals in a considerable number of ,obstruction cases.
In that case the appellants had left two horsed vehicles unattended for five minutes after watering the horses in a main road with two sets of tram lines down the centre, so that any other traffic passing them would have to pull over on to the tram lines, The drivers were found by the police in an inn where they were eating. Lord Reading, in the course of his judgment, said: "For a person to stand still, or to cause his horse and cart to stand still, in the roadway, is not causing an obstruction. AR obstruction will only be^ caused if there is an unreasonable use of the road by stopping."
Mr. Justice Avory in his concurring judgment said:
"The reason why the horses were standing there was that there was a lawful excuse for it, in this sense, that the men had gone to get their dinner or tea, and the horses were stopped in order that they might be watered. In these circumstances J. agree that there was no evidence before the justices of any unlawful or unreasonable user of the highway."
The significance of the decision arises not so much from its facts— as every case of obstruction must be decided on its own facts—but in the clearly expressed direction that the test was "unreasonable use." The test is not whether anyone was in fact obstructed, or whether an obstruction was likely; this should be obvious also from the fact that the offence is one of " unnecessary " obstruction.
More Lenient Attitude . In that particular case there was evidence that some obstruction was caused, but this is merely an element to be considered—although a most important one—in assessing the reasonableness of the act of parking. What is reasonable must be looked at from the standpoint of the average member of the public, and one feels that if this test were applied both by the police and magistrates generally a more lenient attitude towards prosecuted persons would result.
There are clearly some streets where only a very short halt might be justified in almost any event, but merely because a constable alleges that "traffic was reduced to a single line " is not in itself sufficient Proof of the offence.
Two other points might be mentioned. The presence of signs restricting parking in some way in a street is, one feels, a tacit invitation to park immediately outside the restricted area. Yet there have been cases of drivers being fined for quite short halts in such circumstances. Secondly, it is even possible for a driver to find that his vehicle has been turned into an obstruction by the act of a later arrival in further narrowing the space for the flow of traffic—the police charging both indiscriminately.
Man is unfortunately a gregarious animal even when in a vehicle, but for the first-corner to be so penalized is entirely wrong. If the fundamental test of " anreasonableness " laid down 37 years ago were more carefully applied much injustice would be avoided.
It is incumbent upon everyone concerned with the parking problem to see that moves towards a solution are based on a correct interpretation of the law. .