Limitations a the Army Lorry.
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All of us by now will have realized that the motor lorry has fairly won its spurs, if we may use such a mixed metaphor. Its casualty list, to our own knowledge, has already been enormous, so has that of our enemies, Pictorial evidence, if it were needed, was forthcoming on page 79 of a recent issue, and we have other photographs in this office no less conclusive. There are already, however, coming to light certain disabilities which must and will be counted before the campaign is much older.
We refer at this stage in particular to the very great difficulty of turning huge vehicles of three and five-ton types when acting in convoy on ordinary common roads, a difficulty which is greatly increased when bad weather has cut up the surfaces and rendered the roadsides dangerous. We must expect continued considerable losses on both sides from this characteristic difficulty. In other words, it is not easy to withchotw or retreat a column in convoy. In a number of cases it in impossible. How much this trouble is increased for the bulk of the German transport we may imagine, when we recall that a standard German army wagon is a five-tormer of huge proportions, and more often than not hauls a trailer. The photographs reproduced on page 79 were instances of this trailer incubus. All the machines there shown as wrecked had their trailers with them.
The second important consideration, and it is one upon which we have already touched, is the difficulty of advancing in a country already decimated by the operations of the contending armies, in whielisroads have been deliberately destroyed, in which bridges have been rendered useless. Some of our correspondents have already drawn attention to the difficulty of moving a heavily loaded Army lorry over a temporary bridge constructed by the engineers, however. skilfully. This is a phase of the operations which will undoubtedly give more trouble to our enemies than to ourselves, in that they use motor transport units of much greater gross axle weight, to say nothing of their attendant trailers, which we have already mentioned. Yet the roads must be used, by whichever Army advances, for the railways will inevitably be disabled.
Whilst the armies to which transport is attached are advancing, it follows that that transport, as a rule, to reach the troops in the firing line, has to pass over old battlefields, through pestiferous zones of territory, in which the Sanitary Corns may not have been able effedively to operate. This is again another consideration to which our attention is drawn by one of our correspondents. The speed of modern motor transport has done much to neutralize the evils that would arise from such circumstances were the cartage of food through such areas still entrusted to slowmoving horsed-trains.
The difficulties arising from the operation of selfpropelled rear-driven motor vehicles on roads a foot deep in mud are already being experienced. Such troubles will increase as the winter advances. The A22 front and rear-driven tractors of the French army are provided with portable metal track troughs, which have proved efficacious in the French Army Trials of this class of machine. Something similar will, we feel sure, be adopted for all the heavier classes of motor transport in the coming months. This campaign will finally settle the gross weight of the future Army motor wagon. These are but a few of the interesting problems, instances of which are arising every day, and of which we are proud to be in the position to keep our readers informed. We shall have ample opportunity to discuss them at length when more peaceful times are with us.
Zeppelins and Central Stations.
There is one outstanding lesson which must be brought-home to those of us who still maintain our interest in the struggle for supremacy between tramcar and motorbus in these days of dark and gloomy London. As operations develop, and as the weeks go by, increased knowledge of the possibility of damage that can be accomplished by bomb dropping from aircraft becomes available. We in London are constantly reminded of the need for caution in this respect, if we have not the unnerving expsriences of the inhabitants of Antwerp and elsewhere.
The leason we learn from it all is the one we have approached so often : the relative folly of putting all the transport eggs in one basket, and the danger of dislocation of traffic from the disablement of central power stations. No better mark does the-aviator want than the tall chimneys and big buildings of the average electric-supply depot. Our means. of travelling about the great Metropolis would be reduced by half were a Zeppelin successfully to drop bombs on to some great central station—a markfor many miles. The electrifica suberba.n railways, the tubes, and London's greae, tramway network, areal' under this disability.
Our electrical friends have ridiculed suggestions on the same lines that we have put forward in previous days of strike troubles. Now that they are forced to grope through unfamiliar streets in London, losing their way as thoroughly and as quickly as their country cousins in more enlightened days, they will perhaps realize that the risk of grave civil dislocation is perhaps more imminent in the case of the possible destruction of power stations than of any other central buildings. The national gravity of such a disaster might, it is true, be greater in the case of Army, Navy or Civil Service administration buildings, but if ever there were a plea that might be rightly put forward for the self-propelled public-service motorbus, now is the time that its argument can be effectively backed. If London is to be raided by Zeppelins, as we are so frequently told, and as we must at least be prepared to believe the Germans' knowledge of our Metropolis is sufficient to indicate the advisability of strangling our civil activities by incapacitating the central power stations.