KNOW T
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By Les Oldridge, T.Eng (CE MIMI, A M I RTE
Reckless driving
Hidden away in this hotchpotch of legislation is Section 50, which amends Sections 1, 2 and 17 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 dealing with dangerous driving and dangerous cycling. It has received little or no publicity and yet it makes tremendous changes in the law on this subject.
Section 1 of the Road Traffic Act read, before amendment. "A person who causes the death of another person by the driving of a motor vehicle on a road recklessly or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the road, and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which may reasonably be expected to be, on the road, shall be guilty of an offence."' This offence was created because of the reluctance of juries to convict a driver involved in a fatal accident of manslaughter (or in Scotland of culpable homicide), the charge that was preferred before the death by dangerous driving change was available.
Section 1, as amended by the Criminal Law Act, reads: "A person who causes the death of another person by driving a motor vehicle on a road recklessly shall he guilty of an offence."
It will be seen that the phrase "at speed or in a manner dangerous to the public" has been omitted, so that it is now necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused was driving recklessly, a much more difficult task than to convince a,jury that he was driving dangerously.
The Oxford dictionary defines reckless' ' as "devoid of caution,regardless of consequences, rash, heedless of danger, etc." This all implies a guilty state of mind; the person being reckless knows what he is doing and the possible consequences, but he cares not. In reckless driving charges it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the driver was aware of the particular danger, but that he completely ignored it and drove without the care which he should have exercised in consequence of his knowledge of the danger.
Road Traffic, by E. R. Baker and F. B. Dodge, gives the following example to illustrate this point:
-A driver crosses a junction against a red traffic signal_ If this is not deliberate, he could be charged with failing to conform to the traffic signal; if deliberate but with some care, he could be charged with dangerous driving; if deliberate and in a manner showing complete disregard of danger, the charge could be reckless driving. Reckless driving involves "mans rea," an intention to drive dangerously."
Section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 has always been the same as Section 1, except that in Section 2 there is no reference to causing a death.
The Section deals with very bad driving, but where such driving does not result in a fatality.
This principle has been followed in the new legislation, for Section 2 now reads' "A person who drives a motor vehicle on road recklessly shall be guilty of an offence." This is the same Section 1, but without a death.
Section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 deals with the offence driving without due care and attention, or without reasonab consideration for other persons using the road, Except for increase in the penalty from a maximum fine of £200 to £500, tf. Section remains unchanged.
One feels that the change in the law which had made Section offences more difficult to prove will result in more prosecutio being taken under Section 3, careless driving, than was formei the case.
Section 2 carries the more severe penalty of six months imp sonment or El ,000 fine if dealt with summarily and two yeE imprisonment and a fine if tried on indictment, but it would have be an extremely serious case to warrant a penalty of such severii The maximum penalty for a Section 1 offence remains at five yez imprisonment.
There is a mass of stated cases on careless driving; some try define what exactly is meant by -careless driving." For instance, Simpson v Peat 1952, 2 08 24 DC, it was held that the question whether a person was driving carelessly raises only a question fact.
If the defendant was not exercising that degree of care al attention that a reasonable and prudent driver would exercise in t circumstances, he should be convicted. If the circumstances shc that his conduct was not inconsistent with that of a reasonat prudent driver, he should be acquitted. It is undesirable, it was sal to complicate these cases by considering whether or not there h been an "error of judgment."
In Another v Probert (1968) Crim LR 564, a motorist was drivii along a major road, with indicator flashing showing an intention turn left. A police car in a minor road relied on this signal and pull out, but the car drove straight on and a collision occurred (it always a mistake to collide with a police car). It was held that it w clearly careless driving to give misleading signals and it is I argument to say that the police driver should have waited to whether the signal was intended.
In McCrone v Riding (1938) 1 All E.R. 157, it was held that t standard of care and attention is an objective one, fixed ai impersonal, governed by the essential needs of the public and fix in relation to the safety of other users of the highway. The standa is the same in the case of the driver who is a learner holding provisional licence as in the case of the holder of an ordinary drivil licence.
The case of Liddon v Stringer (1967) Crim L.R. 371 is of inter( to public service vehicle drivers. In this case a bus driver, reversil on the signal of his conductor, knocked down and killed a pede ran, He was convicted of careless driving. He appealed on t grounds that he was not vicariously liable for negligence on the II of the conductor. The appeal was dismissed as it was held that t conductor was the driver's "eyes" and that he had a duty to see tlhis "eyes"' were in a position to see what they should see.